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ABSTRACT
In recent years, constitutional theorists have attended to the
unwritten aspects of American constitutionalism and, relatedly, to the
ways in which the constitutional text can be “constructed” upon by
various materials. This Article takes a different approach. Instead of
considering how various materials can supplement or implement the
constitutional text, it focuses on how the text itself is often partially
constructed in American constitutional practice. Although interpreters
typically regard clear text as controlling, this Article contends that
whether the text is perceived to be clear is often affected by various
“modalities” of constitutional interpretation that are normally thought
to come into play only after the text is found to be vague or
ambiguous: the purpose of a constitutional provision, structural
inferences, understandings of the national ethos, consequentialist
considerations, customary practice, and judicial and nonjudicial
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precedent. The constraining effect of clear text, in other words, is
partially constructed by considerations that are commonly regarded
as extratextual. This phenomenon of constructed constraint unsettles
certain distinctions drawn by modern theorists: between interpretation
and construction, between the written and the unwritten constitutions,
and between the Constitution and the “Constitution outside the
Constitution.” Although primarily descriptive, this Article also
suggests that constructed constraint produces benefits for the
constitutional system by helping interpreters negotiate tensions within
democratic constitutionalism.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional theorists are increasingly focused on the
nontextual aspects of the U.S. Constitution. Recent work has
addressed, for example, the existence in the United States of an
1
“unwritten Constitution,” and, relatedly, the ways in which historical
events and precedent can create “constitutional constructions,” as
2
distinct from interpretations of the constitutional text. This effort to
look beyond what is canonically regarded as the Constitution is also
3
evident in theories of the “Constitution outside the Constitution,”
4
and in the consideration of unwritten “constitutional conventions.” A
common theme in these writings is the way in which various
materials, which are sometimes called the “small-c” constitution,
supplement, implement, or interact with the constitutional text, which
5
is referred to as the “big-C” Constitution. In developing this theme,
1. See generally, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE
CONSTITUTION (2008); Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1797; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013
U. ILL. L. REV. 1935.
2. See generally, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); DAVID A. STRAUSS,
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Mitchell N.
Berman, Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision Rules: Thoughts on the
Carving of Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 39 (2010); Mitchell N. Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013).
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1–28 (2010); MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION
MATTERS 6–9 (2010). See generally, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the
Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007).
4. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Conventions in Court 1 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 13–46), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2354491 (“In the United States, it has recently become clear that . . . conventions
are essential to the operation of the U.S. constitutional regime, including the administrative
state.”); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163,
1165 (2013) (“Constitutional theorists periodically (re)discover that the U.S. constitutional law
is heavily based on conventions or unwritten political norms.”) [hereinafter Vermeule,
Conventions of Agency Independence].
5. For discussions of the distinction between the “small-c” and the “big-C” constitutions,
see, for example, ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 3, at 1–28; Richard Primus, Unbundling
Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1082–83 (2013); and Frederick Schauer, Amending
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these writings generally treat the constitutional text as something
analytically separate from whatever makes up the small-c
constitution.
This Article, by contrast, focuses on the construction of the text
itself in American constitutional practice. Under some accounts of
constitutional interpretation, the text plays a minor role. On this view,
interpreters may invoke the text rhetorically, but it does not constrain
6
their claims about the Constitution. These critical accounts can be
contrasted with strictly textualist theories, which maintain that
constitutional interpretation derives its authority from being firmly
grounded in the written Constitution. Accordingly, textualists
contend, the text must be—and often is—followed, at least when it is
7
clear.
This Article contends that neither account accurately describes
American interpretive practice. Textualists are correct in maintaining
8
that, when the constitutional text is perceived to be clear, it operates
as a meaningful constraint in interpretive practice—that is, it limits
and shapes constitutional argumentation and thereby affects the
available courses of action that will be considered constitutional. The
perceived clarity of the text, however, is often partially constructed by
that practice. More precisely, the perceived clarity of the text is not
only a product of typical “plain meaning” considerations such as
dictionary definitions and linguistic conventions. Rather, such
perceived clarity can also be affected by a variety of other
9
considerations, or “modalities,” that are commonly thought to come

the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 145, 156–57 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. There is no canonical definition of textualism, and textualists vary in the kinds of
considerations that they are willing to consider in discerning the meaning of a text. By “strict
textualist,” this Article refers to approaches that are open to considering only a narrow range of
materials when discerning the “plain meaning” of the text. As discussed in Part III.B.2, some
modern variants of textualism are receptive to a broader range of interpretive materials than
were earlier variants. Such receptivity reduces the gap between textualism and the account
provided here. But textualists are unlikely to acknowledge that all of the modalities discussed in
this Article are part of an appropriate textual analysis.
8. More precisely, the text operates as a meaningful constraint when it is perceived to be
(i) clear, (ii) applicable, and (iii) comprehensive in the sense that it says all there is to say about
a constitutional question. For ease of exposition, this Article refers to clear, applicable, and
comprehensive text simply as “clear.”
9. See infra Part II.A.
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into play only in resolving ambiguities in the meaning of the text.
These modalities include reasoning about the purpose of a
constitutional provision, structural inferences, understandings of the
national ethos, consequentialist considerations, customary practice,
11
and precedent.
After establishing this descriptive claim, the Article considers the
implications of constructed constraint for theories of constitutional
interpretation and change. Demonstrating that the clarity of the text
is partially constructed by the full array of modalities of constitutional
interpretation destabilizes the distinction between interpretation and
construction, as well as other distinctions that theorists have drawn
between the written and unwritten aspects of the Constitution. This
Article also responds to potential objections to its account, including
the objection that construction is simply the product of nontextual
interpretive methodologies. Although methodological commitments
might affect the nature and extent of construction in particular
instances, this Article contends that the phenomenon is not reducible
to particular methodological disputes. Even self-proclaimed
textualists cannot help but engage in partially constructing the
meaning of the constitutional text.
This Article concludes by sketching a normative defense of
constructed constraint. This phenomenon, the Article suggests, is an
important way in which interpreters of all sorts (including judges,
government officials, and social movements) work out in practice the
constitutive tensions between a commitment to the rule of law and a

10. When this Article refers to “ambiguities” in the text, it does so in the loose way that the
Supreme Court often does—that is, as a reference both to situations in which the applicability of
the text to particular circumstances is unclear (what legal philosophers would term “vagueness”)
and to situations in which the text could mean more than one specific thing (what legal
philosophers would term “ambiguity”). See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The InterpretationConstruction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 97–98 (2010). Though the distinction
between vagueness and ambiguity is important in some contexts, this distinction is not material
for the account of constructed constraint presented here.
11. By focusing generally on participants in American constitutional practice, this Article
abstracts from the particular ways in which specific participants—including citizens, social
movements, academics, politicians, and judges—interact with the text. There are potential
differences among these groups. For example, social movements may, as a general matter, be
more willing to “work on” the text than judges. Exploring those differences is beyond the
purposes of this Article, which instead emphasizes the similarity that all actors, to some
important extent, partially construct a constraining text.
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commitment to the Constitution’s democratic responsiveness.
Relatedly, constructed constraint helps interpreters navigate a path
between the “dead hand” problem (concerning the authority of
constitutional provisions ratified long ago to bind current
generations) and the countermajoritarian difficulty (concerning the
legitimacy of having unelected judges override the choices of today’s
majorities based on judicial interpretations of these provisions). In
negotiating these tensions, the practice in turn helps to legitimate the
ongoing project of constitutional democracy, both inside and outside
13
the courts.
Part I begins by describing debates from the 1980s between
critical theorists working in the area of constitutional law, who were
skeptical about the constraining effect of the constitutional text, and
other constitutional theorists who hypothesized that the text had a
constraining effect, especially when it was perceived to be clear. Part I
then describes two recent accounts of why the text might constrain—
the “focal point” theory and the “legal fidelity” theory—and argues
that neither theory takes adequate account of how the clarity of the
constitutional text is itself partly constructed. Part II identifies
instances in which participants in American constitutional practice
employ other modalities of constitutional interpretation to partially
construct a constraining—or unconstraining—text. It uses a variety of
case studies to illustrate the phenomenon of construction of textual
ambiguity or clarity: the first word of the First Amendment, the
extension of equal protection principles to action by the federal
government, state sovereign immunity, President Lincoln’s
suspension of habeas corpus, the creation of West Virginia, and
presidential authority to make recess appointments.
Part III considers the implications of constructed constraint for
constitutional theory and anticipates several potential criticisms of
this account: that it is nonfalsifiable, that it reduces to disputes over
methodology, and that it is all construction and no constraint. Part III
also offers some preliminary generalizations about the difficult
question of when construction, as opposed to constraint, is more or
less likely to occur. Finally, this Part suggests some ways that the

12. For a discussion of these tensions, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic
Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25, 25–33 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B.
Siegel eds., 2009).
13. See infra Part III.D.
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practice of constructed constraint produces normative benefits for the
14
constitutional system as a whole.
I. FROM WHETHER TO WHY THE TEXT MATTERS
This Part begins by describing scholarly debates in the 1980s,
involving (among many other things) skepticism by certain members
of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement about whether
constitutional interpreters feel constrained by the constitutional text.
The CLS perspective appears to have receded since those debates,
such that the focus today is less on whether interpreters feel
constrained by the text and more on why they regard the text as
binding. To illustrate this shift in the terms of the debate, this Part
next considers two recent accounts of the role of the text—one by
David Strauss and the other by Jack Balkin—both of which assume
that clear text is experienced as a constraint, but which offer
divergent explanations of why it constrains. As will be explained, both
of these theories are rich and illuminating, but neither takes sufficient
account of a core insight of the earlier CLS theorists—that a variety
of extratextual considerations are likely to affect the perception of
whether the constitutional text is clear. Because of this aspect of
interpretive practice, the constraining effect of the text is itself partly
constructed. One can appreciate this insight without concluding, as
certain CLS theorists in the field of constitutional law appeared to
believe, that there are no textually understood constraints on
constitutional practice. (One can also appreciate this insight without
necessarily endorsing the left-wing political ideology with which the
CLS movement became associated.) As subsequent parts will show,

14. The phenomenon of constructed constraint also arises in statutory interpretation.
Although this Article touches on statutory interpretation in a few places, its focus is on the role
of the constitutional text. Several considerations warrant such a focus, including the age of the
Constitution, the difficulty of amending it, the dead hand problems raised by these facts, the
countermajoritarian issues raised by judicial review, and the general “nature” of a written
constitution (as opposed to a statute). See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407
(1819) (“[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”). For a recent
example of a statutory interpretation decision in which the Court relied on extratextual
considerations in determining that the text was unclear, see Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
2077, 2090 (2014) (“In this case, the ambiguity derives from the improbably broad reach of the
key statutory definition given the term—‘chemical weapon’—being defined; the deeply serious
consequences of adopting such a boundless reading; and the lack of any apparent need to do so
in light of the context from which the statute arose—a treaty about chemical warfare and
terrorism.”).
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even if constraint itself is ultimately constructed, there are meaningful
differences in degree among different kinds of construction.
A. 1980s Debates About Whether the Text Matters
In the 1980s, there was an active and anxious debate about the
role of the text in constitutional interpretation. This debate took
place against the backdrop of the CLS movement, which (like the
legal realist movement of an earlier generation, from whose insights it
drew) was broadly skeptical of formalism in the law, including claims
15
about the determinacy of legal texts. The CLS movement was in turn
influenced by the growing interest in textual interpretation during the
1970s in the areas of anthropology, philosophy, and literary theory,
especially “hermeneutical” insights into the conditions that make
16
interpretation possible. Of particular significance to CLS scholars
(and to some of their critics) was Hans-Georg Gadamer’s theory that
all interpretation unavoidably involves a conversation between an
interpreter and a text, so that any act of interpretation causes the text
17
to merge with the objectives and perspectives of the interpreter.
An early entrant into the 1980s debate about the constitutional
text was the critical legal scholar Paul Brest. In an influential article,
Brest coined the term “originalism” to refer to “the familiar approach
to constitutional adjudication that accords binding authority to the
18
text of the Constitution or the intentions of its adopters.” Brest
critiqued that approach in part by noting that it could not explain
15. For an introduction to the elements of CLS theory, see generally MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); see also Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A
Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1516–37 (1991) (exploring the political aspects of, and
political influences on, the CLS movement).
16. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 101–31 (1996)
(documenting various influences on the CLS movement).
17. See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975). Looking back in
2000, Robin West wrote that “Hans-Georg Gadamer directly or indirectly set much of the
agenda for the entire founding generation of critical legal scholars.” Robin West, Are There
Nothing but Texts in this Class? Interpreting the Interpretive Turns in Legal Thought, 76 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2000). Other important influences include the writings of the
American literary theorist Stanley Fish and leading European “deconstructionist” philosophers
such as Jacques Derrida.
18. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 204 (1980). Brest targeted first-generation originalism, which tended to focus on the
original intent of the Framers of the Constitution. By contrast, second-generation originalism,
which prevails today, tends to focus on the original semantic meaning of the text of the
Constitution. For an overview of the reasons behind and players responsible for this change in
emphasis over time, see Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 378–82 (2013).
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much of modern constitutional law. “[I]f you consider the evolution
of doctrines in just about any extensively-adjudicated area of
constitutional law,” Brest memorably opined, “originalist sources
[have] played a very small role compared to the elaboration of the
Court’s own precedents. It is rather like having a remote ancestor
19
who came over on the Mayflower.”
More fundamentally, Brest criticized originalism by invoking “a
hermeneutic tradition, of which Hans-Georg Gadamar is the leading
20
modern proponent.” This tradition, Brest explained, “holds that we
can never understand the past in its own terms, free from our
21
prejudices or preconceptions.” Given this hermeneutic insight, Brest
suggested, one ought to “appreciate the indeterminate and contingent
nature of the historical understanding that an originalist historian
22
seeks to achieve.”
Having rejected originalism, Brest argued instead for a nonoriginalist approach, which would “accord the text and original
history presumptive weight, but [would] not treat them as
23
authoritative or binding.” Brest offered as the “touchstone[] of
constitutional decisionmaking” this “designedly vague criterion: How
well, compared to possible alternatives, does the practice contribute
to the well-being of our society—or, more narrowly, to the ends of
24
constitutional government?”
That formulation was entirely
unsatisfactory—and anxiety provoking—to traditional academic
25
constitutional lawyers who, in the tradition of Herbert Wechsler,
26
27
Gerald Gunther, and John Hart Ely, sought to defend the idea that
28
law was separable from politics.
Like Brest, Mark Tushnet was critical of both originalism and
textualism. Tushnet combined his critiques with skepticism about the
perceived constraining effect of the constitutional text. In a 1983
19. Brest, supra note 18, at 234.
20. Id. at 221.
21. Id. at 221–22.
22. Id. at 222.
23. Id. at 205.
24. Id. at 226.
25. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1959).
26. See Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1964).
27. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
54–55 (1980).
28. See KALMAN, supra note 16, at 108–10 (noting critical responses to Brest).
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article, he provocatively wrote that “in any interesting case any
reasonably skilled lawyer can reach whatever result he or she
29
wants.” Noting that “[t]he significance of the claim . . . turns on the
definition of ‘interesting,’” he asserted that “the claim holds even if
an ‘interesting’ case is defined as one that some lawyer finds
30
worthwhile to pursue.” Tushnet expanded on this idea two years
later in a critique of textualism in constitutional law. Writing in a
symposium on interpretation, he argued that even purportedly clear
constitutional provisions, like the minimum age requirement and the
two-term limit for presidents, could be rendered contestable by resort
31
to purposive construction or other textual provisions.
Because there was no canonical CLS perspective, and because
many CLS scholars did not focus on the constitutional text, it is
unclear whether and to what extent Tushnet’s claim about the lack of
textually perceived constraint was shared by others. In any event, the
claim was criticized by non-CLS scholars. Fred Schauer argued, for
example, that there were in fact “easy cases” in constitutional law, in
part because of the linguistic clarity of the relevant constitutional
32
text. “[L]anguage can and frequently does speak with a sufficiently
clear voice,” Schauer said, “such that linguistically articulated norms
themselves leave little doubt as to which results are consistent with
33
that command.” As for Tushnet’s contention that any perceived
textual clarity can disappear given the right set of facts, Schauer
suggested that this “argument from weird cases” did not rebut his
34
claim about easy cases. That it may be “impossible to have an
entirely clear constitutional clause,” Schauer wrote, “does not mean
that there are no core cases in which an argument on one side would
be almost universally agreed to be compelling, and an argument on

29. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 819 (1983).
30. Id. at 819 n.119.
31. Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 683, 686–88 (1985); see also Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1174 (1985) (“It is possible the age thirty-five signified to the Framers a
certain level of maturity rather than some intrinsically significant number of years. If so, it is
open to argument whether the translation in our social universe of the clause still means thirtyfive years of age.”).
32. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 404 (1985).
33. Id. at 416.
34. Id. at 420.
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the other side would be almost universally agreed to be specious.”
Tushnet responded by contending that when the political context
changes, “the linguistic constraints on which Schauer relies disappear
36
as well.” Cases are “weird,” Tushnet claimed, only “until someone
37
finds it worthwhile to pursue them.”
The extent to which there was a genuine disagreement between
Tushnet and Schauer turns in part on how broadly one reads their
respective claims. Sanford Levinson, like Tushnet, denied “that any
legal text, including the United States Constitution, can be viewed as
38
a meaningful constraint on an adjudicator’s decision.” But Levinson
also cautioned against overreading Tushnet. “The brunt of Mark
Tushnet’s remarks,” Levinson wrote, “is . . . that anything can be
called into question, given the right political circumstances, including
the presumably ‘clear’ requirement of the Constitution that every
state have two Senators,” and he was unsure “whether Schauer
39
genuinely disagrees.” “As I understand him,” Levinson continued,
“Tushnet does not argue that every single legal term is up for grabs at
every moment, only that every term is potentially up for grabs should
a clever lawyer, backed by a powerful client, find it useful in a given
40
situation.” As an example, Levinson argued that “even if the
fourteenth amendment were not in the Constitution we could be
confident that lawyers (and judges) would seize on allegedly more
41
precise patches of text to achieve ends now served by reliance on it.”
By contrast, the liberal political theorist Don Herzog critically
described Tushnet as embracing “a freewheeling skepticism, a view in
42
which any text can mean anything we want it to.” Herzog rejected

35. Id. at 422; see also Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 191 (1986) (“No
text is clear except in terms of a linguistic and cultural environment, but it doesn’t follow that no
text is clear. The relevant environment, and its bearing on the specific interpretive question,
may be clear.”).
36. Tushnet, supra note 31, at 688 n.24.
37. Id.
38. Sanford Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know (And What Do They Do with Their
Knowledge)? Comments on Schauer and Moore, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 441, 441–42 (1985)
[hereinafter Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know?]; see also Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature,
60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 400–01 (1982).
39. Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know?, supra note 38, at 450–51.
40. Id. at 451.
41. Id. at 451–52.
42. Don Herzog, As Many as Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 75 CALIF. L. REV.
609, 629 (1987).
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what he regarded as Tushnet’s apparent embrace of nihilism, even as
characterized by Levinson. “It is not all that consoling,” he wrote, “to
think that things are up for grabs only when someone wants them to
43
be.” Herzog rejected the “stark binary choice” posed by certain CLS
writers whereby “either rules times facts equals decisions, or it is all
44
up for grabs.”
Also recoiling at assertions of interpretive indeterminacy were
scholars within the legal academy who sought to defend an active role
for the judiciary in improving American society. A prominent
45
example was Owen Fiss, who decried “a new nihilism” and
contended that the hermeneutic insights of other disciplines actually
favored his traditionally liberal position. In his insistence that
“[a]djudication is interpretation” and that “[i]nterpretation, whether
it be in the law or literary domains, is neither a wholly discretionary
46
nor a wholly mechanical activity,” one can see the influence of
hermeneutic insights on his thinking:
Viewing adjudication as interpretation helps to stop the slide
towards nihilism. It makes law possible. We can find in this
conceptualization a recognition of both the subjective and the
objective—the important personal role played by the interpreter in
the meaning-giving process, and yet the possibility of an intersubjective meaning rooted in the idea of disciplining rules and of an
interpretive community that both legitimates those rules and is
47
defined by them.

For Fiss, the impossibility of sealing off the reader from the text did
not drown the law in indeterminacy. On the contrary, it held the
power to save the law from the nihilism of an increasing number of
legal scholars.
A few years later, Fiss would characterize the CLS movement
“as a reaction to a jurisprudence, confidently embraced by the bar in
the sixties, that sees adjudication as the process for interpreting and
48
nurturing a public morality.” He indicted CLS scholars for rejecting
“the notion of law as public ideal” and for instead proclaiming that

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
See Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 740 (1982).
Id. at 739.
Id. at 750.
Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (1986).
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“‘law is politics.’” Their basic problem, Fiss insisted, lay in refusing
“to take law on its own terms, and to accept adjudication as an
institutional arrangement in which public officials seek to elaborate
50
and protect the values that we hold in common.” Fiss saw a critical
difference between CLS writers and both the feminists of his day and
the legal realists of an earlier day: “Critical legal studies scholars want
to unmask the law, but not to make law into an effective instrument
of good public policy or equality. The aim of their critique is
51
critique.”
The 1980s debates about the role of the constitutional text
eventually receded, as did the CLS movement more generally—
although specialized offshoots of the movement persist, such as in the
52
areas of feminist legal theory and critical race theory. Today, most
theorizing about the constitutional text assumes that interpreters
experience some level of constraint, at least for those aspects of the
text that are regarded as clear. The next Section considers two recent
theories that attempt to explain why participants in the practice of
constitutional interpretation view clear constitutional text as binding.
B. Two Recent Accounts of Why the Text Matters
Today there are two primary accounts of why the constitutional
text plays an important role in American interpretive practice: David
Strauss’s focal point theory and Jack Balkin’s legal fidelity theory.
Both of these accounts reject the critical perspective and accept that
clear text is constraining, but they differ about why clear text has this
effect. Importantly for present purposes, neither account focuses on
the extent to which the perceived clarity of the text is itself

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 10. The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin had a complex relationship to CLS
during the 1980s. On the one hand, Dworkin’s understanding of “constructive” interpretation as
“essentially concerned with . . . the purposes . . . of the interpreter,” RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S
EMPIRE 52 (1986), seems compatible with CLS claims about the subjectivity of judicial
decisionmaking. On the other hand, CLS scholars were hostile to Dworkin’s thesis that “in most
hard cases there are right answers to be hunted by reason and imagination.” Id. at viii–ix. He in
return criticized those CLS scholars who “may want to show law in its worst rather than its best
light, to show avenues closed that are in fact open, to move toward a new mystification in
service of undisclosed political goals.” Id. at 275. This criticism was similar to Fiss’s charge that
“[t]he aim of their critique is critique.” Fiss, supra note 48, at 10.
52. The current prominence of ideological explanations of Supreme Court decisionmaking
is also consistent with certain CLS claims. See generally, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
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constructed. This Section describes and identifies some of the
limitations of these accounts.
1. Focal Point Theory. David Strauss’s book, The Living
Constitution, provides a good explanation of the focal point theory of
the importance of the constitutional text. In arguing for “common law
constitutionalism,” Strauss recognizes that constitutional interpreters
53
must not purport to contradict the text of the Constitution. Strauss
accounts for the exalted status of the text by offering a “common
54
ground justification.” His explanation is that the text performs a
settlement function. It is sometimes “more important that things be
settled than that they be settled right, and the provisions of the
55
written Constitution settle things.” In Strauss’s view, the text is
treated as binding because of “the practical judgment that following
this text, despite its shortcomings, is on balance a good thing to do
because it resolves issues that have to be resolved one way or the
56
other.”
Under Strauss’s focal point account, “by and large, the text
57
matters most for the least important questions.” For example, in
commenting on the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning the
separation of powers, Strauss observes that the Court has relied on
the text for technical issues, but has “acted more like a common law
58
court” in more significant cases. “When the stakes are high,” Strauss
claims, the settlement function of the text is less significant because
59
“it is more important to settle the matter right.”
Notwithstanding his view that the text matters most when the
issue matters least, Strauss stresses the awareness of participants in
the constitutional practice that if the text became less sacrosanct, it
would no longer serve as common ground, and all manner of settled

53. See STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 103 (describing as “one of the absolute fixed points of
our legal culture” that “[w]e cannot say that the text of the Constitution doesn’t matter”). For
earlier expressions of his views, see generally David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common
Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003); David A. Strauss, Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law].
54. See STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 111.
55. Id. at 102.
56. Id. at 105.
57. Id. at 110.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 111. Cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 39 (1934) (“Where it makes no important difference which way the decision goes, the Text—in
the absence of countervailing practice—is an excellent traffic light.”).
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questions would be up for grabs. “We do not ‘overrule’ the text,”
Strauss explains, “because any such overruling would jeopardize the
60
ability of the text to serve as a generally accepted focal point.”
Otherwise, disputes could “spin out of control and create serious
61
social divisions.”
There is undoubtedly some truth to the idea that constitutional
text serves as a focal point. Indeed, the public has access to much of
the text in a way that it does not for many other legal materials, such
62
as the more than 550 volumes of Supreme Court precedent. Even so,
this account seems incomplete in several respects. As an initial
matter, there is tension between Strauss’s claim that text generally
matters only for the least important issues and his claim that
participants in the constitutional system recognize that it would be
problematic for the stability of the system to allow deviations. If the
issue is unimportant, it is difficult to see how questioning it would
produce serious social division or would lead to an unraveling of
63
understandings on more important issues. Furthermore, contrary to
his claim that the text is relied upon as a constraint primarily for
matters of low importance, the Supreme Court at times has invoked
the text to invalidate major innovations in the distribution of
authority between Congress and the president, such as the legislative
64
veto in INS v. Chadha and the line item veto in Clinton v. City of
65
New York.
Moreover, Strauss’s account does not seem to sufficiently
distinguish the status of the text from that of certain other forms of
constitutional authority. Judicial precedents, for example, may serve a
60. Strauss, Common Law, supra note 53, at 911; see also Larry Alexander & Frederick
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1376 (1997)
(“Without a written constitution as a stabilizing force, there is a risk that too many issues
needing at least intermediate term settlement will remain excessively uncertain.”).
61. STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 105.
62. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“A constitution, to
contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all
the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal
code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be
understood by the public.”). On the other hand, the proverbial person in the street may know
more about the rights protected in Brown, Miranda, and Roe than she does about much of the
constitutional text.
63. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, American Constitutionalism—Written, Unwritten, and Living,
126 HARV. L. REV. F. 195, 198, 201 (2013) (noting tension between Strauss’s focal point account
and his view of the minor role of the text).
64. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
65. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
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focal point or settlement function that is similar to the function
Strauss attributes to the text. Revisiting precedents that have long
been deemed settled, like disregarding the text, “takes time and
energy” and “can spin out of control and create serious social
66
divisions.” Indeed, given Strauss’s belief that most of the important
aspects of modern constitutional law are not based on the text, the
danger of unsettling the law would seem to be greater from
questioning precedent than from questioning the text. The same can
potentially be said of unwritten “constitutional conventions,” which,
67
like text and precedent, can serve as an important focal point.
In Strauss’s defense, the text may be a better focal point than
judicial precedent, at least as a general matter. This is because the
text is much harder to amend—and participants know this. To amend
precedent, one must (at most) change the Court’s composition in a
decisive and desired way. (This assumes, as seems accurate, that stare
decisis is relatively weak in constitutional cases.) By contrast, textual
amendments must run the Article V gauntlet. Over the course of
American history, there have been many more changes in
constitutional law through partisan entrenchment than through
68
constitutional amendment.
Even if the text is generally a better focal point than precedent,
however, a focal point approach does not seem sufficient to
distinguish the status of the two. No matter how much of a focal point
function certain precedents perform, most constitutional interpreters
deem it permissible, at least in principle, for the Court to revisit
almost all of them (and for other interpreters to urge the Court to
revisit them). By contrast, no portion of constitutional text is so
69
regarded despite whatever focal point function it performs. Rather,
an amendment is deemed necessary to overcome text that is
perceived to be clear. If the text were only a focal point, then it would
be entitled only to presumptive weight (as the CLS scholar Paul Brest

66. STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 105.
67. See Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, supra note 4, at 1192.
68. See generally Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
489 (2006) (discussing these changes); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001) (same). Between 1789 and 2004, the
Supreme Court overruled 208 constitutional precedents in 133 cases. See MICHAEL J.
GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 9 (2008).
69. See Schauer, supra note 32, at 437 (noting that “precedents can be discarded if
necessary in a way that textual language cannot”).
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70

had argued ), and deviations from the text would be permissible if
the stakes were high enough. Yet, as Strauss himself acknowledges,
“one of the absolute fixed points of our legal culture is that we cannot
71
do that.” The reasons why the constitutional text is such a fixed
point in the United States are difficult to determine, and any
explanation would presumably need to engage with historical and
sociological aspects of American constitutionalism. The key point for
present purposes is that the text operates differently in American
interpretive practice than does precedent.
A focal point explanation of the role of the constitutional text
would also require a more detailed account than Strauss offers of the
incentives of various interpreters to maintain the text as a focal point.
Such an account, to be persuasive, would need to include an
explanation of how participants overcome obvious collective action
72
problems, both at a particular time and over time. It may be that,
contra Strauss, participants in the practice overcome collective action
problems not simply for self-interested reasons, but also through a
process of norm internalization that emphasizes the constraining
73
quality of constitutional text that is deemed clear.
In sum, no matter what the stakes, it is not an acceptable move in
American constitutional discourse to argue that the constitutional
74
text may lawfully be disregarded, whereas it is an acceptable move

70. See supra text accompanying note 23 (quoting Brest, supra note 18, at 205).
71. STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 103; see also Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the
Written Constitution: A Comment on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1435, 1446 (1997) (describing “a deep-seated cultural commitment to written
constitutionalism in this country”); Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 2011, 2016 (2012) (reviewing BALKIN, supra note 2, and STRAUSS, supra note 2) (“[T]he
focal-point account of the Constitution does not fully capture the role the Constitution plays in
American life.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CAL. L. REV. 975, 994
(2009) (“Explanations of constitutional law as just a system of equilibria involving purely selfinterested actors cannot account adequately for the law’s insistent claims to normative
authority.”).
72. Collective action problems are ones in which individually rational conduct leads to
collectively irrational results. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action
Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117, 135–44 (2010).
73. For discussions of the relationship between law and norm internalization, see generally,
for example, TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006), and Robert Cooter, Do
Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV.
1577 (2000).
74. There have been occasional suggestions that necessity trumps the Constitution,
particularly by interpreters with a relatively narrow view of the scope of federal power. See, e.g.,
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J.B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 418 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1904) (“A strict observance of the written laws is
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to argue that a judicial precedent (or nonjudicial precedent) should
75
be overturned, even if it is well settled. A common law approach
seems unable to make sufficient sense of the special importance of
the text in constitutional practice. The text is more than a common
ground or convenience, and certain parts of it are not subject to
change via common law methods. The text, when it is deemed clear, is
characteristically regarded as binding law that may legitimately be
changed only through a formal amendment. The socialization of
lawyers and the public, as well as elite audience costs, seem to
disallow open disregard of the constitutional text to a degree that
76
seems distinct from other constitutional materials.
Constitutional text seems special in other ways as well. For
example, one feature of the role of the text in interpretive practice is
that, as Michael Dorf has noted, it tends to crowd out freestanding
77
claims of constitutional custom. This is not an inevitable effect of
having a legal text. Under international law, custom is a freestanding

doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity,
of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation.”). But such
claims are rare. The effect of exigency on perceptions about whether the constitutional text is
clear or ambiguous is explored in Part II.D.
75. One might object that the constitutional text is sometimes disregarded, as a practical
matter, through judicial nonenforcement or underenforcement. For example, the Supreme
Court has long held that Article IV, Section 4’s guarantee to each state of a republican form of
government presents a political question and so may not be enforced by the judiciary. See, e.g.,
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). There is a difference, however, between judicial
unwillingness to enforce the text because of perceived limits on judicial authority or capacity
and affirmative endorsement of government action perceived to be contrary to the text. When
the Court declines to enforce the text, it is not claiming that the text may lawfully be
disregarded.
76. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 708 (2011) (“[I]t is an indisputable feature of
constitutional practice that the text is taken to be authoritative within its domain. That domain
is limited, but significant.”); id. at 709 (“More broadly, our commitment to the text creates a
discursive requirement that all constitutional norms and arguments be couched as
‘interpretations’ of the big-C Constitution.”); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 384 (1981) (“For the purposes of legal reasoning, the binding quality of the
constitutional text is itself incapable of and not in need of further demonstration. It is our
master rule of recognition, one initially so intended and understood and one which our
‘tradition’ in fact continues to perpetuate.”).
77. See Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional
Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 69
(Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009). It is possible, however, that certain
customary practices assume constitutional status as claims on the constitutional structure, which
are asserted to supplement the text. For discussions of structural reasoning, see CHARLES L.
BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969), and PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION ch. 6 (1982).
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source of law that can operate not only in conjunction with written
treaty text, but even in opposition to it. For example, in the 2013
debate over possible military intervention in Syria, the British
government claimed that the general ban on the use of force in the
U.N. Charter had been modified (or was in the process of being
modified) by a narrow customary exception for humanitarian
78
intervention. By contrast, a claim of customary override of the text is
79
almost never made in U.S. constitutional discourse.
In fact, even freestanding customary claims that do not
contradict the text are unusual in the discourse. To take one example,
the text of the Constitution is silent about whether the president may
unilaterally terminate treaties (which require two-thirds senatorial
80
consent in order to be ratified). Substantial modern customary
practice supports such unilateral presidential authority, and the
Executive Branch unsurprisingly refers to it—but it does so as a
81
purported “gloss” on the phrase “executive Power” in Article II, not
82
as a freestanding claim of customary constitutional law. Strauss may
miss some of these interpretive practices because his common law
constitutional theory focuses on the courts, even as he makes passing
reference to nonjudicial precedent. It seems likely, however, that the
text can affect both what gets brought to the courts and how
83
constitutional law develops outside the courts.
Finally, the special nature of the constitutional text is implicitly
reflected in certain debates in constitutional theory about
constitutional change—for example, responses to Bruce Ackerman’s
influential theory of “constitutional moments” as valid non–Article V
78. See Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime—UK Government Legal Position (Aug.
29,
2013),
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2013/images/08/29/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrianregime-uk-government-legal-position.pdf.
79. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 1, at xii (“[T]he written Constitution itself operates on a
higher legal plane, and a clear constitutional command may not as a rule be trumped by a mere
case, statute, or custom.”).
80. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
81. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
82. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution: The
Problems of Constitutional Interpretation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 192 (1988) (“[J]udges
sometimes admit that constitutional interpretation is sensitive to historical evolution and that
history adds a ‘gloss’ on the text. But they never admit to deriving the authority for their
decisions from outside the constitutional text . . . .”); see generally Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty
Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773, 815–16 (2014).
83. Cf. Schauer, supra note 32, at 408–14 (looking beyond litigation for “easy cases” by
noting, among other things, the many matters that are never pursued beyond the lawyer’s
office).
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84

amendments. Critics of Ackerman’s theory tend to be more
comfortable with the idea of changing interpretations of an
unchanging constitutional text (until properly amended via Article V)
than they are with the idea of unwritten amendments to the text, even
85
though the practical effect of the two may be similar. This response
appears to reflect a belief that, even if malleable, the constitutional
text operates as a constraint on politics and that it will lose this
characteristic if it can be amended informally.
2. Legal Fidelity Theory. Jack Balkin’s book Living Originalism
provides a different account of the constraining nature of the
constitutional text. In arguing for “framework originalism,” Balkin
contends that the Constitution provides “an initial framework for
86
governance that sets politics in motion.” Framework originalism is a
mostly underdeterminate decisional approach. It requires fidelity to,
and only to, the framework—to the original semantic meaning of “the
87
rules, standards, and principles stated by the Constitution’s text.”
88
Balkin distinguishes his theory from “skyscraper originalism,” which
is what most people imagine when they imagine originalism.
Skyscraper originalists make much greater demands on the present by
requiring fidelity to original intentions, purposes, or expected
applications, even when they purport to care only about semantic
89
meaning.
In Balkin’s view, regarding oneself as bound by more than the
framework renders one unable to explain the American constitutional
tradition, including its greatest achievements. On the other hand,
regarding oneself as bound by less than the framework leads to the
difficulty presented by Strauss’s account of common law

84. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); BRUCE ACKERMAN, 3 WE THE
PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).
85. See generally, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11
CONST. COMMENT. 115 (1994); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221
(1995).
86. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 3.
87. Id. at 3; see also id. at 45.
88. Id. at 21–23.
89. See id. at 104 (“[T]oday’s original meaning originalists often view original expected
applications as very strong evidence of original meaning . . . . Hence, even though conservative
originalists may distinguish between the ideas of original meaning and original expected
applications in theory, they often conflate them in practice.”).
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constitutionalism: viewing the text as a mere focal point does not
explain its special role. As Balkin notes, “Once we recognize that
precedents are focal points too, the focal-points theory does not really
explain why courts cannot change the hard-wired rules of the
90
Constitution through common law adjudication.” Of course, a court
may be concerned that an open disregard of the text would place
greater strain on its legitimacy. As Balkin points out, however, “this
simply raises the deeper question of why the public and politicians
alike assume that we should not be able to change the constitutional
91
text by common law methods of judicial decision.”
Compared with Strauss’s living constitutionalism, Balkin’s
framework originalism makes better sense of widely shared
convictions about the constitutional text—namely, that like properly
enacted statutes of long duration, it is binding law, so that one is not
92
free to ignore it when it is regarded as clear. Contrary to some CLS
93
claims in the 1980s, almost no one would be persuaded by a
“purposive” (re)construction of the various clauses imposing age
qualifications for federal offices—for example, a claim that someone
under the age of thirty-five could be elected president as long as he or
she had a certain level of maturity, or a claim that the age
requirement is actually higher than thirty-five because, with
increasing longevity, people tend to mature more slowly today. Of
course, the text itself does not logically preclude such an argument—
94
the text itself is just marks on a page. Rather, the argument is
unpersuasive because of a complicated and somewhat mysterious set
of norms and assumptions that seem largely taken for granted in the
American interpretive practice, such as the rule-oriented function of
numbers in legal texts and the perceived desirability of having a

90. Id. at 53.
91. Id. at 53–54.
92. See Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797,
810 (1982) (“A theory of constitutional language is incomplete if it does not recognize the way
in which a text is authoritative—the way in which we treat the Constitution, but not, for
example, the Declaration of Independence or the Mayflower Compact, as law.”); see also Neil S.
Siegel, Jack Balkin’s Rich Historicism and Diet Originalism: Health Benefits and Risks for the
Constitutional System, 111 MICH. L. REV. 931, 947 (2013) (arguing that Balkin better accounts
for these widely shared convictions about the text than does Strauss).
93. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
94. Cf. Frank H. Easterbook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 536 (1983) (“The
philosophy of language, and most particularly the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, has established
that sets of words do not possess intrinsic meanings and cannot be given them . . . .”) (citing
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS §§ 138–242 (1953)).
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bright-line approach to issues like candidate qualifications. It may be
possible to imagine highly unusual circumstances in which those
norms and assumptions could be altered, but they would not change
merely because “some lawyer finds [it] worthwhile to pursue” a
95
different course of action. (The conditions under which construction
of the text is more or less likely are explored further in Part III.C.)
Similarly, as much as scholars like Sanford Levinson lament
various structural features of the Constitution, they do not argue that
we are free to ignore them—to abolish via statute, say, the Electoral
College, the equal representation of the states in the Senate, or the
president’s veto power. On the contrary, Levinson’s concerns spring
from the recognition that, because the text is regarded as clear on
these matters, he cannot responsibly advocate that ignoring clear text
96
is consistent with legality. (Whether this recognition is consistent
with Levinson’s claims about textual indeterminacy during the 1980s
97
is another question. ) Similarly, conservatives who complain about
certain features of the constitutional text, such as the Seventeenth
Amendment, assume that their only option is to persuade enough
98
other Americans to amend the text formally.
In accord with Balkin’s account, the reason these issues are not
revisited is that the text is understood to settle them. The reason is
not, as Strauss’s account suggests, that they are viewed as
unimportant or that there is a tacit understanding that revisiting them
would be harmful to the constitutional system. The text seems to
matter even when the issues matter.
But Balkin’s account, too, has its limitations. The special role of
the text in interpretive practice requires more of an explanation than
99
the claim that “the text continues in force today because it is law.”
As Strauss notes, there are different conceptions of law, and although
an authoritative text may be central under a “command conception”
95. See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 819 n.119.
96. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 173 (2006)
(suggesting constitutional amendments and a more general constitutional convention to revise
the text); see also Rapaczynski, supra note 82, at 202 (“Vague as the seventh amendment may
be, every lawyer knows that a judiciary reform akin to that adopted in Britain, which for all
practical purposes abolished the jury in civil cases, could not pass muster in the Unites States,
even in the face of very strong evidence that the present system is less accurate or more wasteful
than the alternative.”).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 38–40.
98. See generally, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, THE LIBERTY AMENDMENTS: RESTORING THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2013).
99. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 55.
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of law (which envisions law as emanating from a central sovereign
source), it is much less central to customary and common law
100
conceptions. More fundamentally, as the legal philosopher H.L.A.
Hart explained, the extent to which particular materials are viewed as
101
law turns on the relevant community’s rules of recognition. It may
be correct to say, as Balkin does, that the American interpretive
community views the constitutional text as a particularly sacrosanct
form of law, but this observation does not itself explain why that is
the case.
The particular role of the constitutional text in American
interpretive practice (like other features of the practice) may be
102
historically contingent, as H. Jefferson Powell has argued.
Relatedly, it is possible that constitutional text plays a less significant
role in the interpretive practices of some countries than it does in the
103
United States. If so, then the role of the constitutional text does not
follow automatically from the idea of fidelity to law, which many
nations share—including nations like the United Kingdom, New
104
Zealand, and Israel, which lack written constitutions. Moreover, as
noted above, international law has an extensive amount of written
law (in the form of treaties), and yet it is understood that such written
105
law can in theory be superseded by customary norms.
100. See STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 36–38.
101. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94–99 (2d ed. 1994); see generally THE RULE
OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma
eds., 2009) (applying the concept of the rule of recognition to U.S. constitutional law); Akhil
Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114
HARV. L. REV. 26, 33 (2000) (“Of course, any document can claim to be supreme law.
Something more is needed to make it so. That something, according to legal positivists, is social
convention.”).
102. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN
HISTORY AND POLITICS 6 (2005) (“Constitutional law is historically conditioned and politically
shaped.”).
103. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1809–10 (2005) (“Many countries have had written constitutions that appeared on paper
to meet high moral standards but that were ignored in practice or otherwise rendered
meaningless through interpretation.”); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 863, 870 (2013) (defining “sham constitutionalism” as “[t]he failure to perform
upon self-imposed, publicly proclaimed commitments”; attempting to measure empirically the
robustness of this phenomenon; and finding that (among many other things) Africa and Asia
are home to a substantial majority of the world’s sham constitutions).
104. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 76, at 709 (“Some countries have a constitutional system
that is based largely on unwritten conventions and not on a single, sanctified text. Other
countries have official, parchment constitutions that are mostly or entirely ignored.”).
105. See supra text accompanying note 78. Nor does the existence of a written constitution
compel an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. See generally Andrew B. Coan,
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There is another potential problem with Balkin’s account that is
even more salient for present purposes. Framework originalism,
Balkin suggests, involves applying the original semantic meaning of
the constitutional text. He explains that this enterprise produces
results that are largely in accord with the convictions of Americans
living today, rather than those long gone, because the semantic
meaning of the text often sounds in principles or standards rather
than rules. When applying the text, Balkin writes, post-Founding
interpreters have in effect been delegated substantial discretion to
flesh out the meaning of the Constitution in practice. This account,
however, does not sufficiently consider the extent to which American
interpretive practice stretches the text or adopts workarounds that
106
render it less important. Interpreters do not simply apply the
semantic meaning of the text, and they do not necessarily take the
text as given. To return to Balkin’s metaphor of building out a preset
framework, sometimes interpreters instead shift to an alternative
foundation. Thus, whereas Strauss’s account seems to give too little
weight to the text, Balkin’s account seems to give too much.
Indeed, Balkin’s insistence that participants in the practice
adhere to original semantic meaning is in tension with his recognition
of the importance of citizens and social movements in constitutional
development. Balkin’s account seeks to explain “how the entire
system of constitutional construction—including the work of the
political branches, courts, political parties, social movements, interest
groups, and individual citizens—is consistent with democratic
107
legitimacy.”
By describing citizens and social movements as
engaged in “construction,” Balkin assumes fidelity to the original
framework, because construction, under his theory, takes place on the
framework. The difficulty for Balkin’s account is that successful social

The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1067
(2010) (arguing that a comparative examination of the legal regimes in other countries
establishes “that originalism is nothing like the dominant approach among large, wellfunctioning constitutional democracies”).
106. See STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 106–11; see also Mark Tushnet, Constitutional
Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1503 (2009) (observing that when “[f]inding some
constitutional text obstructing our ability to reach a desired goal, we work around that text using
other texts—and do so without (obviously) distorting the tools we use”).
107. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 279.
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movements may have little idea about, or interest in, the original
108
semantic meaning of the constitutional text.
For example, many political advocates for gun rights invoke the
text of the Second Amendment, but they presumably know little or
nothing about the original meaning of the Second Amendment.
Likewise, many political advocates for gay rights invoke the text of
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, but they presumably
know little or nothing about the original meaning of these clauses—
let alone the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s
109
Due Process Clause. Notwithstanding such ignorance on questions
of original meaning, the activities of these advocates and those of
their adversaries have greatly affected the constitutional
understandings that enter public discourse and, eventually, judicial
decisions. Balkin’s living constitutionalist theory of constitutional
change can account for this phenomenon only if he insulates his living
constitutionalism from his framework originalism, and only if he ties
his living constitutionalism to the bare text—which social movements
do know and routinely invoke—shorn of its original semantic
meaning. To be descriptively accurate about the practice of American
constitutional interpretation, in other words, Balkin must give up his
originalism.
C. Omissions in the Present Debate
Although Strauss’s focal point theory and Balkin’s legal fidelity
theory both offer important insights about the role of the
constitutional text, they also share an important limitation. Neither
sufficiently acknowledges the extent to which the perceived clarity of
the text is not only a product of traditional “plain meaning”
considerations such as dictionary definitions and linguistic
conventions, but can also be affected by considerations that are
commonly thought to come into play only in resolving textual
ambiguities. In this regard, these accounts are somewhat like those of
the textualists and originalists whom CLS scholars critiqued in the
1980s, with the important difference that Balkin and Strauss view the

108. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About
Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 394–95 (2007); Dorf, supra note 71, at 2043, 2055; Siegel,
supra note 92, at 937–38.
109. See Siegel, supra note 92, at 938. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s extension of
the equal protection guarantee to conduct by the federal government, see infra Part II.C.
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text, even when clear, as resolving relatively little of significance to
110
modern constitutional debates.
This Article contends that it is important to investigate not only
why American interpreters regard themselves as bound by
constitutional text that they deem clear (which Strauss and Balkin
seek to explain), but also what factors affect perceptions of textual
clarity (which they do not pursue). The constitutional text is not
merely a fixed structure to be built upon, to use Balkin’s metaphor.
Rather, the text is also something that is itself partly constructed and
reconstructed. The next Part uses a variety of case studies to illustrate
the phenomenon that this Article calls “constructed constraint.”
II. CONSTRUCTING TEXTUAL AMBIGUITY OR CLARITY
Participants in American constitutional practice typically agree
that, when the constitutional text is clear, it is controlling. They often
debate, however, whether the text is clear and, to the extent that it is
not, what should be consulted in resolving textual ambiguities. What
these debates obscure is that the perception of clarity or ambiguity is
itself often affected by interpretive considerations that are commonly
thought to be extratextual. In other words, the clarity of the
constitutional text is partly constructed in American interpretive
practice. To illustrate the construction of textual ambiguity or clarity,
this Part presents a variety of case studies, some involving individual
111
rights and others involving constitutional structure.

110. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1196 (1987) (“One reason we see relatively few
arguments from the text is that the language of the Constitution, considered as a factor
independent from the other kinds of argument familiar in constitutional debate, resolves so few
hard questions.”).
111. An analogous issue arises regarding the Chevron doctrine in administrative law. That
doctrine is often described as having two steps. First, a court determines whether a statute that
is administered by an agency is clear. If so, the court simply applies the statute, even if contrary
to the agency’s interpretation. If the statute is unclear, however, the court proceeds to the
second step and considers whether the agency reasonably construed the ambiguous language in
the statute. Some commentators have noted that, for purposes of step one, factors other than
the semantic meaning of the text can affect the perception of textual clarity. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2106 (1990)
(“Whether there is ambiguity—the nominal trigger for deference under Chevron—is a function
not ‘simply’ of text, but of text as it interacts with principles of interpretation, some of them
deeply engrained in the legal culture or even the culture more generally.”); cf. Matthew C.
Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 598 (2009)
(understanding Chevron not as involving two steps but as involving “a single inquiry into the
reasonableness of the agency’s statutory interpretation”). Of less relevance here, some
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The suggestion that the clarity or ambiguity of the constitutional
text is partially constructed by interpretive practice is consistent with
some of the claims about interpretation made by CLS scholars in the
1980s, as discussed in Part I.A. But the phenomenon described in this
Part, it should be emphasized, is one of constructed constraint. As the
case studies show, for any given issue there are limits on the extent to
which textual clarity is subject to extratextual construction. As
discussed in Part III.B.3, moreover, a number of important
constitutional provisions appear to be subject to construction only in
the most extraordinary circumstances.
A. Modalities of Constitutional Interpretation
Philip Bobbitt, in his 1982 book Constitutional Fate, identified six
“modalities” of constitutional argument that participants in American
constitutional practice—from the time of the Marshall Court to the
present—have invoked as authority to support their favored
112
interpretations of the Constitution. Bobbitt’s catalogue has proven
enormously influential. For example, it has been taught in American
law schools, either explicitly or implicitly, to generations of law
113
students.
In Bobbitt’s rendition, textual arguments rely on the language of
the text of the Constitution, as well as the rules for interpreting
constitutional texts (as opposed to other kinds of legal texts,
especially statutes). Historical arguments appeal either to
preratification history (such as debates over whether to ratify the
Constitution) or to postratification history (such as arguments from
tradition, historic governmental practices, or societal changes).
Structural arguments examine the constitutional text (or a part of the
constitutional text) as a whole, drawing inferences from the theory
and structure of government created by the Constitution in order to
discern how the constitutional system is supposed to function in
commentators argue that there is now a “Step Zero” to determine whether the agency action
falls within the domain of what Chevron covers. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step
Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2007) (“But in the last period, the most important and confusing
questions have involved . . . . Chevron Step-Zero—the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron
framework applies at all.”).
112. See generally BOBBITT, supra note 77; PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 11–22 (1993) (identifying and applying his six modalities of constitutional
argument).
113. See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 53–
59 (5th ed. 2006) (using Bobbitt’s typology to identify the kinds of constitutional arguments
invoked by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland).
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practice. Ethos arguments tell a story about national identity; they
typically take a narrative or historical form and ask whether a given
interpretation of the Constitution exhibits fidelity to the meaning or
destiny of the country, its deepest cultural commitments, or its
national character. Prudential or consequentialist arguments identify
the good or bad social consequences of an interpretation. Precedential
arguments offer the existence of previous decisions, either of past
political practice or past judicial rulings, as justifying a certain
outcome in a later case.
As illuminating as Bobbitt’s typology is, there are at least two
reasons not to be strictly bound by it. First, Bobbitt’s typology omits
certain modalities. For example, invocations of the purpose of a
constitutional provision warrant separate treatment because they are
distinguishable from both the textual modality and the structural
approach. Purposivism shares with textual interpretation a focus on
particular constitutional provisions, but there can be tensions
between “plain meaning” arguments and purposive arguments, as
114
textualists are quick to point out. In addition, purposivism shares
with structural interpretation a concern with the proper functioning
of the constitutional system, either in whole or in part, but
purposivism is clause-bound in a way that structural argumentation is
115
not.
Second, Bobbitt groups together certain kinds of constitutional
arguments that warrant being separated. Judicial and political
precedent are both forms of precedential reasoning, but they are
significantly different forms. With customary political branch practice,
unlike U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a single prior action or
decision generally does not warrant deference in constitutional
interpretation. Instead, the search is typically for longstanding
patterns of behavior by the political branches. Similarly, it is not
obvious that preratification and postratification history are best
114. See generally, e.g., John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of
Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004); John F. Manning, What Divides
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, What
Divides].
115. There may be other modalities. For example, the Supreme Court sometimes has
considered the authority typically possessed by nations in the international community when
construing the constitutional authority of Congress or the president in foreign affairs. See, e.g.,
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (“The United States are a sovereign
and independent nation, and are vested by the Constitution with the entire control of
international relations, and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that
control, and to make it effective.”).
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considered jointly and distinguished from textual argument.
Originalists, for example, are likely to accept the former but not the
latter as relevant to textual interpretation, especially if the
116
postratification practice occurs long after the Founding.
Whatever the right list, the modality of textual argumentation is
typically considered distinct from the other modalities. Nontextual
modalities can appropriately be considered, according to the
orthodox view, only to resolve ambiguities in the text. The Supreme
117
Court has endorsed this proposition in numerous decisions.
Moreover, when dissenting opinions invoke the proposition, the
majority does not contest it; instead, the majority typically argues that
118
the text is unclear or inapplicable. The proposition that clear text is
controlling has rhetorical power precisely because of the widely
shared assumption that it is an essentially incontestable principle of
American constitutional interpretation.
The examples below reveal, however, that this standard
bifurcation between clear and unclear text tends to overlook an
116. Some originalists may accept the proposition that postratification practices helped to
“liquidate” certain ambiguities in the text of the Constitution. See generally, e.g., Caleb Nelson,
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003). For a critical analysis
of the concept of liquidation, see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical
Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV.
(forthcoming).
117. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1957) (plurality opinion) (“This Court has
constantly reiterated that the language of the Constitution where clear and unambiguous must
be given its plain evident meaning.”); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731–32 (1931)
(“The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used
in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning; where the intention is
clear there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition.”); Lake
Cnty. v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889) (“[W]hen the text of a constitutional provision is
not ambiguous, the courts, in giving construction thereto, are not at liberty to search for its
meaning beyond the instrument.”); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 302–03 (1827) (“If this
provision in the constitution was unambiguous, and its meaning entirely free from doubt, there
would be no door left open for construction, or any proper ground upon which the intention of
the framers of the constitution could be inquired into: this Court would be bound to give to it its
full operation, whatever might be the views entertained of its expediency.”). Similarly, in the
Supreme Court’s recent recess appointments decision discussed below in Part II.F, no Justice
suggested that extratextual considerations such as historical practice could trump clear text.
Rather, the two coalitions disagreed about whether the text was clear and about the extent to
which extratextual considerations should inform the interpretation of ambiguous text.
118. Compare, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“[P]lain text is the Man of Steel in a confrontation with ‘background principle[s]’
and ‘postulates which limit and control.’”) (citations omitted), with id. at 69 (Rehnquist, J.,
majority opinion) (“The dissent’s lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh Amendment is
directed at a straw man . . . .”). See also infra Part II.F (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision
in Noel Canning).
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important aspect of American interpretive practice: the same
considerations that are potentially relevant in resolving the meaning
of ambiguous text can also affect the perceived clarity of the text in
the first instance. Although it is not possible to determine the extent
of this phenomenon through a limited series of examples, the ones
discussed below reflect mainstream and significant areas of
constitutional law. Moreover, each of these examples illustrates the
influence of multiple modalities. As a result, it seems fair to conclude
that the phenomenon described here, even if its precise frequency is
uncertain, is an important and recurring feature of U.S. constitutional
practice. To the extent that accounts of American interpretive
119
practice fail to incorporate this phenomenon, they are incomplete.
The examples that follow illustrate how a variety of modalities
come into play, often in an interactive fashion, in constructing
understandings about clarity and ambiguity in the constitutional text.
Some of these examples involve the interpretation of specific words in

119. This account bears some resemblance to Richard Fallon’s “constructivist coherence”
theory of constitutional interpretation, although the objectives and natures of the two projects
are distinct. Fallon’s theory aims “to supply a needed structure to decisionmakers struggling
with difficult constitutional issues.” Fallon, supra note 110, at 1269. Specifically, Fallon seeks to
help decisionmakers solve “the commensurability problem”—that is, “the problem of how
different kinds of constitutional argument are appropriately combined and weighed against each
other within our constitutional practice.” Id. at 1285. According to Fallon’s influential theory, it
typically is possible for constitutional interpreters to achieve “constructivist coherence,” a
Rawlsian reflective equilibrium in which the various modalities influence one another or,
occasionally, cause reassessments, with the result that interpreters are able to come to rest on a
particular outcome. When such an effort to achieve coherence fails, Fallon’s theory calls for
assigning “the categories of argument . . . a hierarchical order in which the highest ranked factor
clearly requiring an outcome prevails over lower ranked factors.” Id. at 1191. Fallon concludes
that “the implicit norms of our constitutional practice accord the foremost authority to
arguments from text, followed, in descending order, by arguments concerning the framers’
intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and moral and policy values.” Id. at 1193–94. Because
he wants to show how the commensurability problem can be solved, Fallon focuses on the
substantial interrelatedness and interdependence among all of the different kinds of
constitutional argument. By contrast, this Article does not attempt to solve the
commensurability problem. Rather, its primary goal is to demonstrate the construction of
textual clarity or ambiguity in particular. Relatedly, Fallon’s theory is interpretive and therefore
has both descriptive and normative elements. See, e.g., id. at 1233. By contrast, this Article is
primarily descriptive. For an approach similar to Fallon’s in the area of statutory interpretation,
which draws from the philosophical insights of hermeneutics and pragmatism to describe and
defend statutory interpretation as a form of practical reasoning, see generally William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip J. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 321 (1990).
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the Constitution. Others involve an interpretation of the scope or
120
exclusivity of particular provisions.
B. Nonliteral Construction: The First Word of the First Amendment
Construed literally, the text of the First Amendment seems
directed at Congress alone: it provides that “Congress shall make no
121
It does not appear to be directed at the federal
law . . . .”
government generally, such as the Executive Branch, the
122
treatymakers, and the federal judiciary. Not surprisingly, therefore,
strict textualists read it in this restrictive fashion. In fact, Gary
Lawson and Guy Seidman not only conclude that “the First
Amendment by its terms does not apply to executive and judicial
action,” but also argue that “[t]o read the First Amendment to apply
to entities other than Congress is simply to abandon the enterprise of
123
textual interpretation.” Likewise, Nicholas Rosenkranz has urged
that “precisely because, as a textual matter, the First Amendment is
such an easy case, it presents the starkest counterpoint to
conventional wisdom—which willfully ignores the subject of the First
124
Amendment.” Mark Denbeaux has made an originalist argument in
125
support of the same conclusion.

120. The examples primarily, although not exclusively, involve the construction of ambiguity
rather than clarity. It is more difficult to discern the construction of clarity because, by
definition, those involved in the interpretive practice may not perceive that the text could have
been interpreted otherwise. Consider, for example, the constitutional requirement that “[n]o
person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President.” U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 5 (emphasis added). Because of the placement of the commas, this clause, if read
literally, suggests that only individuals alive at the time the Constitution was adopted are
eligible to be president. For purposive and consequentialist reasons, however, the clause never
has been read that way. See generally Jordan Steiker, Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Taking
Text and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential
Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1995). For another example of the construction of textual
clarity, see the discussion of Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Noel Canning in Part II.F.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
122. The first word says “Congress,” not “the United States,” and the text elsewhere
distinguishes the legislative power of Congress (see Article I, Section 8) from the enforcement
power of the Executive (see the Take Care Clause of Article II, Section 3).
123. GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 42 (2004) (footnote omitted).
124. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1210,
1250 (2010).
125. See Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV.
1156, 1201 (1986) (“None of the various sources of relevant information provides any evidence
to alter, vary, or contradict the plain meaning of the first word of the first amendment.”).
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American constitutional practice, however, has always viewed
the First Amendment as relevant to the conduct of the entire federal
government, not just Congress. As far back as 1833, Circuit Justice
Henry Baldwin observed that the First Amendment “wholly prohibits
the action of the legislative or judicial power of the Union on the
subject matter of a religious establishment, or any restraint on the
126
free exercise of religion.” More recently, the Court has taken for
granted that First Amendment principles govern executive and
127
judicial actions, both federal and state.
128
Consider, for example, the famous Pentagon Papers Case,
which the Court decided in 1971. The Court there rejected on First
Amendment grounds President Nixon’s request that a federal court
enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing
what the Executive Branch deemed national security secrets
129
regarding the conduct of the Vietnam War. No federal statute was
at issue; the case turned exclusively on the president’s request for a
judicial prior restraint on speech. Even so, the Court viewed the First
Amendment as controlling without so much as pausing to consider
the potential import of the first word of the First Amendment. The
Justices viewed the First Amendment as so clearly not limited to
130
Congress that they did not even see the first word.

126. Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 427 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1837) (Baldwin, J.). As Jack Balkin
notes, although Magill was “the earliest federal decision even to imagine that there was an
issue,” it “simply assumed that the First Amendment applied to all branches of the federal
government.” BALKIN, supra note 2, at 205; see also Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132,
1142 (10th Cir. 2006) (majority opinion of McConnell, J.) (“As this history shows, there was no
intention to confine the reach of the First Amendment to the legislative branch.”).
127. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 441–42 (1988)
(subjecting the conduct of the U.S. Forest Service to scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (reviewing the denial of unemployment
compensation by a state employment security commission for consistency with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments); Carroll v. President of Princess Anne Cnty., 393 U.S. 175, 185 (1968)
(invalidating a prior restraint ordered by a state court); Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415, 420 (1971) (same).
128. N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
129. Id. at 714.
130. See, e.g., id. at 715 (Black, J., concurring) (“Now, for the first time in the 182 years since
the founding of the Republic, the federal courts are asked to hold that the First Amendment
does not mean what it says, but rather means that the Government can halt the publication of
current news of vital importance to the people of this country.”) (emphasis added); Justice
Douglas, see id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring), and Justice Brennan, see id. at 725 (Brennan, J.,
concurring), made similar statements. Nor did the dissenters (Burger, Harlan, and Blackmun)
pause over the first word of the First Amendment.
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Although the Court itself has not provided an explanation for its
approach, legal scholars have defended it vigorously. For example,
Akhil Amar writes that “[t]he First Amendment’s first word,
‘Congress,’ is now read as a synecdoche: The right of free expression
applies against all branches of the federal government and rightly
131
so.” “If the president and federal courts cannot censor citizens even
with the backing of a congressional law,” Amar reasons, “it would be
132
odd to think that they can do so without such a law.” “In essence,”
Amar writes elsewhere, “the amendment declared certain preexisting
principles of liberty and self-government—‘the free exercise of
religion’ and ‘the freedom of speech, [and] of the press’—that
implicitly applied against all federal branches (not just Congress) and
133
all federal actions (not just laws).” Underscoring the stakes, he adds
that “a president today may not condition a pardon on a promise that
the recipient will not join a particular church or will refrain from
speaking out against the administration; nor may federal judges
impose a religious test on courtroom spectators or bar them from
134
publishing criticism of the judiciary.”
Similarly, Jack Balkin argues that the reference to “Congress” in
the First Amendment is a clear case of nonliteral usage—that it is “a
synecdoche or metonym that stands for all of the lawmaking and law
135
enforcement operations of the federal government.” Alternatively,
he argues that if “Congress” means only “Congress” as a matter of
semantic meaning, then a structural principle of anticircumvention
136
should be understood to supplement the text. Like Amar, Balkin
stresses some arresting consequences of reaching the opposite
conclusion:
[T]erritorial legislatures and federal sheriffs could punish people for
speaking out against the government or practicing their religion.
Federal judges could issue prior restraints against books distributed
in the nation’s capitol, federal post offices could refuse to deliver
mail the president did not like, and the president, acting in his

131. AMAR, supra note 1, at 34.
132. Id.; see also id. (“Limits on the less electorally accountable branches of the federal
government follow a fortiori from those imposed on Congress.”).
133. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 316 (2005).
134. Id.
135. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 204–05.
136. See id. at 204.
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capacity as commander in chief, could order all U.S. soldiers to pray
137
to the same god for victory.

Balkin does not see how any principle that would distinguish
congressional censorship from judicial or executive censorship
“makes sense either at the time of the founding or today, and a very
138
long history of practice rejects the idea.”
Putting aside the proper interpretation of the term “Congress” in
the First Amendment, it is instructive to consider why American
constitutional practice has never adopted the term’s literal meaning.
139
Nothing in the literal meaning of the term seems unclear,
particularly given the definition of the term “Congress” in Article I,
Section 1, as “consist[ing] of a Senate and House of
140
Representatives.” Instead, any lack of clarity appears to be driven
by considerations sounding in constitutional purposes, structural and
consequentialist considerations, longstanding practice, and extensive
141
judicial precedent. For example, no account of the basic objectives
of the First Amendment—whether realizing collective selfgovernance, promoting public debate, protecting personal autonomy,
142
or finding truth through a marketplace of ideas —can explain why
congressional speech suppression should often be prohibited but
executive or judicial speech suppression should always be permitted.
As a result, American interpretive practice has never purported to
allow presidents and judges to act contrary to the basic purposes of

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Likewise, a literal reading of Article I, Section 3, appears to imply that the vice
president may preside over his or her own impeachment. But that cannot be correct. See AMAR,
supra note 1, at 3–22.
140. See also supra note 122 (noting additional reasons why the literal meaning of the word
“Congress” in the First Amendment seems clear).
141. One might add an originalist argument, as then-Judge Michael McConnell did in Shrum
v. City of Coweta in concluding that the Free Exercise Clause applies to executive action. See
Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1140–41 (10th Cir. 2006) (examining evidence
concerning the intent of the drafters of the First Amendment); id. at 1142 (refuting Denbeaux,
see supra note 125, at 1169–70). But given that the Supreme Court has not seemed interested in
the original history, and given that few commentators would deem that history decisive, it is
doubtful that a commitment to originalism explains the practice of reading “Congress” in the
First Amendment nonliterally.
142. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform
of Public Discourse, in CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 268–89 (1995) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS] (critically analyzing
different theoretical accounts of the function of the First Amendment).
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the First Amendment while prohibiting Congresses from doing so.
Indeed, exempting presidents and courts from the strictures of the
First Amendment has been viewed as so fundamentally
counterpurposive that most constitutional interpreters have followed
Amar and Balkin in deeming the First Amendment not as ambiguous,
but as clearly meaning the opposite of what it literally seems to say.
C. “Thinkability”: Equal Protection and the Federal Government
144

Bolling v. Sharpe was one of four companion cases to Brown v.
145
Board of Education, which held that de jure racial segregation by
states in public education violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
146
Fourteenth Amendment. All five cases involved racial segregation
in public education. The Court disposed of Bolling separately,
however, because it concerned segregation in the District of
Columbia, which is a federal enclave for constitutional purposes, and
the Equal Protection Clause by its terms applies only to states, not
the federal government. Even so, the Court in Bolling invalidated
racial segregation by the federal government as well.
As David Strauss observes, even though “Bolling has, at best, a
very uncertain basis in the text of the Constitution,” the decision “has
147
not only survived, but thrived.” Nevertheless, the decision remains
controversial among some commentators because of an alleged lack
of support in the text of the Constitution and because of an
143. Notably, even strict textualists identify workarounds to render their interpretations less
disruptive of existing practice. See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 124, at 1272 n.253 (arguing that
the Take Care Clause “reflects a principle of nondiscrimination (on the basis of speech and
religion, among other things) in the execution of law”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The
Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1061 (2011) (arguing that if free speech is a
privilege or immunity of national citizenship, “it is protected more comprehensively at the state
level than at the federal level,” and thus may include challenges to state executive or judicial
action); see also Daniel J. Hemel, Executive Action and the First Amendment’s First Word, 40
PEPP. L. REV. 601, 604 (2013) (contending that “executive action that encroaches upon First
Amendment freedom is either (a) action authorized by a statute, in which case the statute itself
violates the First Amendment, or (b) ultra vires executive action that runs afoul of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause”). Such efforts to discern workarounds often seem sensitive
to the same considerations that affect perceptions of textual clarity and thus can themselves be
seen as part of the phenomenon of constructed constraint.
144. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
145. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
146. Id. at 495.
147. David A. Strauss, Not Unwritten, After All?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1541 (2013)
(reviewing AMAR, supra note 1); see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013)
(citing Bolling with approval); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995)
(same).
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observation that Chief Justice Warren made at the end of his short
opinion: “In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the
states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on
148
the Federal Government.” This statement has been read to suggest
that extralegal considerations took precedence over constitutional
149
principle.
It is of course possible that the Court was simply ignoring or
overriding the constitutional text without saying so. It is worth noting,
however, that the Court began its analysis with the text, invoking the
150
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, rather
than asserting that this clause contains an equal protection
component, as the opinion is commonly interpreted today, the Court
151
appeared to conduct a substantive due process analysis. Writing for
the Court, Chief Justice Warren reasoned that “the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal
of fairness, are not mutually exclusive,” and that “discrimination may
152
be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.” Turning to the
case at hand, he concluded that “[s]egregation in public education is
not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and
thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a
burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in
153
violation of the Due Process Clause.” This language is plausibly
154
read to reflect substantive due process reasoning.
In support of both the result in Bolling and the Court’s reliance
on the Due Process Clause, Jack Balkin has offered an originalist
argument that “due process already includes ideas of equal

148. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
149. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment’s Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55
N.C. L. REV. 541, 546 (1977) (noting that the reasoning in Bolling “lay the Court open to the
charge that what it found ‘unthinkable’ was the political implication of a contrary decision,
rather than an anomaly of constitutional principle”).
150. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”).
151. Although the Court and commentators have read Bolling as “finding” an equal
protection “component” in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Lawrence Lessig
observes that “[n]o such ‘component’ was ever ‘found’” in Bolling. Lawrence Lessig,
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 409 (1995).
152. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
153. Id. at 500.
154. For a discussion of how the substantive due process analysis in Bolling could be seen as
building on suggestions in earlier decisions, see generally Karst, supra note 149.
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protection.” Many legal scholars, however, are skeptical that
156
Bolling can be justified on originalist grounds. Regardless of who
has the better of this historical argument, it seems unlikely that any
Justice, including the self-identified originalists Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas, “would permit the federal government to
segregate schools in the District of Columbia, even though the only
applicable constitutional provision is the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which was ratified at a time when the Constitution
157
contemplated slavery.”
Other commentators have supported the result in Bolling but not
the Court’s reliance on the Due Process Clause. They have offered a
variety of textual sources for the right declared in Bolling. For
example, Bruce Ackerman has relied on the Citizenship Clause of
158
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Mark Graber has
159
pointed to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of that same section.
160
John Hart Ely invoked, among other things, the Ninth Amendment.
Taking a more holistic approach, Akhil Amar has relied on a
combination of the Preamble, Article IV’s Guarantee Clause, Article
I’s bans on federal and state titles of nobility and bills of attainder,
and the Reconstruction Amendments, all of which (he argues) forbid
the federal government from stigmatizing people because of who they
161
are as members of an inferior caste. According to Amar, “In light of

155. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 252.
156. See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 2, at 130 (describing “[t]he principle [declared in Bolling]
that the federal government may not discriminate” based on race as “one that neither the text of
the Constitution nor the original understanding can support”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN
ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 2, 72, 131 (2005)
(leveraging originalism’s inability to justify Bolling as a reason to reject constitutional
“fundamentalism”); Brest, supra note 18, at 233 (stating that he “cannot think of a plausible
argument against th[e] result [in Bolling]—other than the entirely correct originalist observation
that it is not supported by even a generous reading of the fifth amendment”).
157. Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 30; see also Fallon, supra note 103, at 1823 (“Justices of
all substantive persuasions have felt entitled not only to uphold Bolling but also to expand upon
its commitments.”). Some commentators, however, have argued that Bolling was wrongly
decided. Most notably, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 84 (1990) (criticizing Bolling as “social engineering from the bench”).
158. Bruce Ackerman, Ackerman, J., Concurring, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 100, 114–16 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
159. Mark A. Graber, A Constitutional Conspiracy Unmasked: Why “No State” Does Not
Mean “No State”, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 87 (1993).
160. See ELY, supra note 27, at 33; see also, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 146 (1994) (defending Bolling based on the Ninth
Amendment).
161. AMAR, supra note 1, at 143–45.
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all these constitutional clauses, all these structural considerations, and
all this historical evidence, Brown and Bolling were not just correct
162
but clearly correct.”
In sum, neither the Court nor most commentators have
concluded that the federal government is free to discriminate on the
basis of race without constitutional limit, even though the text of the
Equal Protection Clause clearly does not apply to the federal
government. Instead, some judges and commentators have invoked
doctrinal or originalist reasoning in viewing the text of the Due
Process Clause as compatible with the result in Bolling. Other
commentators have invoked different portions of constitutional text
to justify the result in the case. For interpreters in the first category,
nontextual modalities of constitutional interpretation inform their
judgment that the text of the Due Process Clause can support the
result in Bolling. For interpreters in the second category, the clarity of
the text of the Due Process Clause remains unaffected by other
modalities of interpretation, but other constitutional text is deemed
sufficient to support the result.
What about Chief Justice Warren’s reference to the
“unthinkable”? Read charitably, one way of understanding this
statement is that the Court considered some combination of
structural, consequentialist, purposive, and ethos considerations as
relevant to determining what was a permissible interpretation of the
text. Structurally, for example, it may seem odd that the same
Congress that is charged with enforcing the guarantees of the Civil
War Amendments against the states (including the right declared in
Brown) would be free to ignore those very guarantees. It remains odd
even if one can come up with (contestable) reasons why the federal
government and the states are differently situated with respect to
163
their relative likelihoods of violating minority rights.

162. Id. at 145. For a recent originalist account that supports Amar’s view, see generally
Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493
(2013).
163. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 522 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“A sound distinction between federal and state (or local) action based on race rests
not only upon the substance of the Civil War Amendments, but upon social reality and
governmental theory.” (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison))). The Court
abandoned any such distinction in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(“[W]e hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”).
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In addition, there is little doubt that the Court in Brown and
Bolling was committing itself to a certain conception of the American
164
ethos—to the meaning and destiny of the country. Allowing the
federal government to engage in practices of racial subordination was
incompatible with that conception. The Warren Court took a
significant gamble because its racially egalitarian conception of the
American ethos conflicted with the dominant understanding in an
165
entire region of the nation.
Whatever one may think of the various modalities of
constitutional argument that the Court and commentators have
invoked to justify (or, in rare instances, to condemn) Bolling, the
decision illustrates the more general phenomenon that the
constitutional text can be experienced as both constructed and
constraining. Almost everyone who has considered whether the result
in Bolling can be justified has attempted to find a way to connect
what is morally desirable with the constitutional text. On the one
hand, considerations of what the text can reasonably support appear
themselves to be affected by this normative judgment. On the other
hand, there seems to be a perception that the ability to work with the
text is limited. For this issue, the shared acknowledgment that the text
is not infinitely malleable causes some commentators to mine
constitutional history, others to try to find text that is more suitable,
still others to engage the Constitution holistically and structurally,
166
and a remaining few to conclude that constitutional law has run out.

164. See Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 167, 169
(1987) (suggesting that the authority of the U.S. Constitution flows in important part from its
status as the embodiment of Americans’ “fundamental nature as a people,” their national
“ethos,” which “is sacred and demands our respectful acknowledgement”).
165. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 142, at 23, 43 (“The Court’s embrace of the value of
racial equality could have been a misreading of the national ethos; indeed the Court’s gamble
was intensely controversial and came close to failing precisely because the ethos was in fact so
divided.”).
166. Another example of construction involving the Fifth Amendment concerns the
meaning of the word “person.” The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the privilege against
self-incrimination has long been understood to protect only natural persons and not
corporations, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906), the guarantee of due process has long been
understood to protect corporations, Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 176
(1893). Because both the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Due Process Clause expressly
protect “person[s],” the Court must have been using modalities other than the plain meaning of
the word “person” to distinguish the two clauses.
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D. What Clear Text Does and Does Not Cover: The Eleventh
Amendment
Sometimes textual clarity or ambiguity concerns what the text
does and does not cover—that is, whether the text says all that there
is to say about a certain matter, or whether interpreters should not
draw such a negative inference. Adopted in 1795, the Eleventh
Amendment reads, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
167
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Although
this amendment is the central textual support for the immunity of
U.S. states from private lawsuits, it appears to apply only to suits
brought by out-of-state residents and foreign citizens. Nevertheless,
for more than one hundred years, the Supreme Court has held that
states possess significant immunity from suits brought by their own
citizens, and that state sovereign immunity applies in federal question
as well as diversity cases. Since the 1990s, the Court has adopted a
particularly expansive conception of this immunity. Regardless of the
merits of the Court’s position, however, it is oversimplified to claim,
as some critics have, that the Court has “been fighting the words of
168
the [E]leventh [A]mendment,” or that its decisions “contradict the
169
unambiguous limitations of the Eleventh Amendment’s text,” or
that “the [E]leventh [A]mendment is universally taken not to mean
170
what it says.”
The seminal decision holding that state sovereign immunity is
broader than what is suggested by the text of the Eleventh
171
Amendment is Hans v. Louisiana, in which a resident of Louisiana
sued the state to recover unpaid interest on state bonds, arguing that
172
the state had violated the Contracts Clause. Responding to the
contention that the Eleventh Amendment is limited to suits by out-ofstate residents and foreign citizens, the Court acknowledged that the
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
168. Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1342, 1342 (1989).
169. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1476 (1987).
Amar, however, regarded the text of the Eleventh Amendment as the beginning, not the end, of
his analysis. See id. at 1484.
170. Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 516 (1977).
171. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
172. Id. at 1.
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173

text “does so read.” But the Court said that reading this language
literally would create an “anomalous result” whereby federal
question jurisdiction would be disallowed in cases brought by
174
noncitizens, but allowed in cases brought by citizens. In attempting
to avoid this result, the Court did not purport to disregard the text.
Instead, it hypothesized that, rather than representing an effort to
codify the constitutional law of sovereign immunity, the text was a
specific response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v.
175
Georgia, in which the Court had controversially construed the
Article III judicial power as extending to suits brought against states
176
by out-of-state residents.
Ever since Hans, the Court has recognized a doctrine of state
sovereign immunity that is more robust than the text of the Eleventh
Amendment suggests. The Court has held, for example, that states
enjoy immunity in admiralty actions, even though the text of the
177
Eleventh Amendment refers only to suits in law and equity. It has
also held that states are entitled to immunity when sued by foreign
nations or Indian tribes, even though such suits are not mentioned in
178
the Eleventh Amendment. More dramatically, the Court held in
1996 that Congress generally lacks the authority to override state
sovereign immunity, including in cases that do not fall within the
179
terms of the Eleventh Amendment. In addition, the Court has held

173. Id. at 10.
174. Id.
175. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
176. Id. at 420. Several Justices in Chisholm emphasized that Article III expressly extends
the judicial power to “controversies . . . between a State and citizens of another State.” See, e.g.,
id. at 431.
177. See, e.g., Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 503, 511 (1921).
178. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Notak, 501 U.S. 775, 788 (1991); Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 332 (1934).
179. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (concluding that
Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity using its powers under Article I,
Section 8). The Court has held that Congress has some authority to override state sovereign
immunity when acting under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (holding that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
validly abrogates state sovereign immunity as applied to the fundamental right of access to the
courts); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003) (holding that to remedy
and deter violations of equal protection, Congress had authority under Section 5 to enact a
provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act requiring employers to provide unpaid family
leave to men and women); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment is “necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment”). It has also held that Congress has some authority to override
immunity pursuant to its Article I power to regulate bankruptcy, notwithstanding the suggestion
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that, even though the Eleventh Amendment speaks only to the
judicial power of the federal courts, state sovereign immunity applies
180
in state courts and federal administrative agencies.
The Court has explained that it has “understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
181
presupposition . . . which it confirms.” A variety of other textual
provisions, the Court has claimed, confirm that states “are not
relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, but
182
retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty.”
Under the Court’s account of the Founding, the states entered the
Union as sovereigns, and, although they gave up some attributes of
sovereignty, they did not (for the most part) relinquish their
immunity from private lawsuits. The original Constitution, under this
view, did not grant the national government authority to override the
immunity attribute of sovereignty, and it did not give the federal
courts the authority to hear private suits against unconsenting
183
states. Chisholm, the argument runs, incorrectly held otherwise with
respect to the Citizen–State Diversity Clauses of Article III, and the
Eleventh Amendment corrected that mistake without limiting the
more general background attribute of state sovereign immunity.
Thus, the Court has claimed, “To rest on the words of the
Amendment alone would be to engage in the type of ahistorical
literalism we have rejected in interpreting the scope of the States’
184
sovereign immunity since the discredited decision in Chisholm.”
Notably, although the dissenting Justices in these cases have
accused the majority of disregarding the text, they have argued for
something other than the most literal reading of the Eleventh
Amendment. Because the Eleventh Amendment refers to “any suit in
law or equity,” the most literal reading of the text would, as noted
above, bar federal court jurisdiction over federal question suits
brought by out-of-state residents but not by in-state residents, a result
in Seminole Tribe that none of Congress’s Article I powers was sufficient for this purpose. Cent.
Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006).
180. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
181. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779.
182. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715.
183. But cf. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll., 546 U.S. at 373 (“Insofar as orders ancillary to the
bankruptcy courts’ in rem jurisdiction, like orders directing turnover of preferential transfers,
implicate States’ sovereign immunity from suit, the States agreed in the plan of the Convention
not to assert that immunity.”).
184. Alden, 527 U.S. at 730.
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that seems to make no sense from a structural or purposive
perspective. As a result, and because the language of the Eleventh
Amendment tracks the language of the Citizen–State Diversity
Clauses of Article III, the dissenting Justices have contended that the
Amendment should be interpreted as “simply repeal[ing] the CitizenState Diversity Clauses of Article III for all cases in which the State
185
appears as a defendant.” This approach is attentive to the wording
of the Eleventh Amendment, but not as attentive as the “plain
meaning” theory of the Amendment, which would disallow the
exercise even of federal question jurisdiction in a suit against a state
by an out-of-state citizen. Accordingly, like the Justices in the
majority, the dissenting Justices have read the Eleventh Amendment
186
purposively. They have simply differed with the majority over
whether the Amendment should be understood as a comprehensive
approach to state sovereign immunity, an issue that turns in part on
187
one’s view of the relevant history.
The modern Supreme Court’s claim about the original
understanding of state sovereign immunity is obviously contestable,
and it has been sharply disputed by dissenting Justices and numerous
commentators. Some scholars have also disagreed on methodological
grounds with the Court’s purposive approach to understanding what
185. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 109–10 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); see
also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 289 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he [Eleventh] Amendment was intended to remedy an interpretation of the Constitution
that would have had the state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses of Article III abrogating
the state law of sovereign immunity on state-law causes of action brought in federal courts.”).
For commentary endorsing the diversity theory, see, for example, William A. Fletcher, A
Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative
Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1035
(1983), and John J. Gibbons, Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 2005 (1983).
186. Even though he has supported a broader approach to immunity based in part on
longstanding precedent, Justice Scalia (a self-proclaimed textualist) has acknowledged that if
immunity were limited to the terms of the Eleventh Amendment, the diversity interpretation
would be the best reading of the Amendment. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,
31 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that if the text of the
Amendment were comprehensive, “it would unquestionably be most reasonable to interpret it
as providing immunity only when the sole basis of federal jurisdiction is the diversity of
citizenship that it describes”).
187. For an argument that the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment made sense when
written, see Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1818 (2010). For arguments that the literal text should be followed
regardless of whether it seems to make sense, see Marshall, supra note 168; Manning, What
Divides, supra note 114, at 75; and Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 65 (1989).
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the text of the Eleventh Amendment does and does not do. For the
analysis here, the key point is not whether the Court is right—and
most scholars, it should be noted, disagree with the Court—but what
the example shows about the role of the constitutional text in making
arguments about who is right.
This example shows how the perceived clarity of the
constitutional text can operate on more than one level. That is, the
perceived clarity of the text can turn on what it says, and it can turn
189
on whether it says all that there is to say. The Court has not
disputed that the text covers only suits by out-of-state residents and
foreign citizens, or that it applies only to suits in the federal courts.
But, because of a mix of historical, structural, purposive, and
consequentialist considerations, the Court has rejected the view that
the Amendment is best read as a comprehensive provision, as
opposed to a targeted response to Chisholm. In other words, the
Court has rejected the negative inference that the Eleventh
Amendment operates as a ceiling on the extent of the states’
immunity from suit.
E. The Crises of the Civil War
Another modality that can affect perceptions of textual clarity or
ambiguity concerns the likely consequences of adopting one
interpretation or another, a consideration that can become especially
significant during times of crisis. Two episodes from the Civil War,
one involving President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus and
the other involving the creation of the state of West Virginia,
illustrate this point.
1. Lincoln and Habeas Corpus. The Constitution provides, in
Article I, Section 9, that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
190
Invasion the public Safety may require it.” Because this Suspension
Clause is located in Article I, which focuses on Congress, and because
of structural concerns about Executive Branch aggrandizement
through individual detentions, it is generally assumed that only
Congress has the authority to suspend the writ. For example, in the

188. See generally, e.g., Manning, What Divides, supra note 114.
189. Cf. generally Easterbrook, supra note 94 (analyzing the question of what a legal text
covers).
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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Supreme Court’s 2004 “war on terror” decision in Hamdi v.
191
Rumsfeld, all nine Justices appeared to share this assumption,
despite otherwise disagreeing substantially about the issues of
192
presidential power presented in that case. At the outset of the Civil
War, however, President Lincoln authorized the military to suspend
the writ without any action by Congress, which was out of session
193
(during a time in history when congressional recesses were lengthy ).
His action might be seen as a disregard of clear constitutional text, as
informed by the constitutional structure, in the name of exigency.
Support for such an interpretation could be found in the famous
rhetorical question that Lincoln posed to Congress several months
later: “[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the
Government itself go to pieces, lest that one [concerning habeas] be
194
violated?”
The example is in fact more complicated than that. Lincoln’s
principal argument concerning the suspension of habeas corpus was
not that he needed to disregard one law in order to save other laws,
but rather that he had not violated any law at all. Immediately after
posing his rhetorical question, Lincoln stated that “it was not believed
195
that this question was presented.” It was not presented, he
maintained, because he believed that his actions were justified by a
constitutional argument that engaged the text:
[T]he Constitution itself, is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise
the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous
emergency, it cannot be believed that the framers of the instrument
intended, that in every case, the danger should run its course, until
Congress could be called together; the very assembling of which
196
might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion.

191. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
192. See id. at 525 (“Only in the rarest of circumstances has Congress seen fit to suspend the
writ. . . . At all other times, it has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it
does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.”); id. at 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Although this provision does not state that suspension must be effected by, or authorized by,
a legislative act, it has been so understood, consistent with English practice and the Clause’s
placement in Article I.”); id. at 592–94 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (appearing to assume that only
Congress may suspend the writ).
193. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1498 (2005).
194. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 430–31.
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Regardless of whether this argument is ultimately persuasive, it seems
at least legally plausible in light of the circumstances that Lincoln
faced. These circumstances included not only open insurrection by a
number of states, but also a military threat to the nation’s capital
197
itself.
More generally, if suspension of the writ will sometimes be
necessary when responding to an invasion or rebellion, as the
Constitution appears to assume, such a necessity presumably could
arise when Congress was out of session and when it was infeasible for
Congress to assemble with sufficient speed to address the matter. If
so, it is not clear why the Constitution would preclude what would
otherwise be a necessary response in these circumstances, particularly
when the clause is written in the passive voice. This sort of reasoning
shows how purposive and consequentialist arguments can potentially
combine with textual considerations to make what might otherwise
seem to be clear about the constitutional text somewhat less clear.
The habeas example also shows, however, that even in the
context of an emergency threatening the very existence of the nation,
the president and others took the constitutional text seriously.
Lincoln felt obliged to explain how his actions accorded with the text,
and there was a robust debate during the Civil War about whether his
198
argument was persuasive. It is also worth noting that no other
president has attempted to suspend the writ—not even President
George W. Bush after the September 11, 2001 attacks, despite making
otherwise robust claims about executive authority. Accordingly, even

197. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Story of Ex parte Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy
Combatants, and Congressional Authorization, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 93, 101–03
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009); see also DANIEL FARBER,
LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 163 (2003) (“[A]lthough the constitutional issue can hardly be
considered free from doubt, on balance Lincoln’s use of habeas in areas of insurrection or actual
war should be considered constitutionally appropriate, at least in the absence of any contrary
action by Congress.”).
198. For a list of pamphlets and other materials published on the question during the War,
see the appendix to Sydney G. Fisher, The Suspension of Habeas Corpus During the War of the
Rebellion, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 454, 485–88 (1888); see also JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 118 (1926) (“Perhaps no other feature of Union policy was more
widely criticized nor more strenuously defended . . . .”). For a thorough canvassing of the public
debate over the legality of suspension, see MARK E. NEELY, JR., LINCOLN AND THE TRIUMPH
OF THE NATION: CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 62–113 (2011).
Lincoln’s argument was rejected by Chief Justice Taney, based in part on the location of the
Suspension Clause in Article I. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
For a detailed account of the case, see generally BRIAN MCGINTY, THE BODY OF JOHN
MERRYMAN: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS (2011).
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though the clarity of the Suspension Clause may not be fully
independent of purposive, structural, and consequentialist
considerations, the text nevertheless appears to constrain, both inside
and outside the courts. The phenomenon, again, is one of both
construction and constraint.
2. The Creation of West Virginia. Before the Civil War, politics
in Virginia had long been defined by a competition for power
between the slave-rich eastern counties politically centered at
Richmond and the slave-poor western counties centered at
199
Wheeling. Unsurprisingly, this geographically identifiable cleavage
in Virginia politics structured the intrastate dispute over secession
from the Union in 1861. Whereas most Virginians emphatically
supported secession after the Southern attack on Fort Sumter,
Virginians in the northwest counties emphatically opposed
200
secession. In May, delegates from twenty-five of the northwest
counties met at an initial convention in Wheeling and voted to ask
201
Richmond to approve the creation of a new state. They took more
aggressive action once a state constitutional convention adopted an
“Ordinance of Secession” and Virginians voted overwhelmingly to
secede during the spring of 1861. After Union forces from Ohio
crossed the river at Wheeling and Parkersburg and moved east into
the mountains with help from local militia, delegates from thirty-nine
202
counties held a second convention in Wheeling. John Carlile there
proposed that the government of Virginia be reorganized. Existing
state officeholders, he reasoned, were no longer entitled to hold their
203
positions because they were trying to secede.
The convention delegates debated how to arrange the
separation—specifically, whether the northwest counties should
secede from Virginia or should instead re-form the government of
Virginia. Carlile argued that secession was not a constitutionally
available option in light of Article IV, Section 3, which provides that
“no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of

199. See HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 1 AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 282 (2013); D.W. MEINIG, 2 THE
SHAPING OF AMERICA: A GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 500 YEARS OF HISTORY 481
(1993).
200. GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 199, at 282–83.
201. MEINIG, supra note 199, at 481–82.
202. Id. at 482.
203. GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 199, at 283.
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any other State; . . . without the consent of the Legislatures of the
204
States concerned as well as of the Congress.” Agreeing with
Carlile’s argument from the constitutional text, the convention
delegates declared that their objective was not “to create a State, but
205
to save one.”
The delegates may have been particularly attuned to the
constitutionality of their actions because they were accusing the
secessionists in Virginia of violating the Constitution and so did not
themselves want to be seen as doing the same thing. Instead of
ignoring the text, they developed a two-part plan that they deemed
consistent with it. First, the convention would re-form the
government of Virginia. This one true government of Virginia would
be called “The Restored Government of Virginia.” Second, the
convention would seek Congress’s consent to create a new state out
206
of Virginia’s northwest counties.
And that is what the convention delegates did. Francis Pierpont
was named the new governor, and delegates from the convention
207
became the new state legislators. In July 1861, the delegates met at
the new capital, Wheeling, the geographic center of the separation
movement. There they filled various state offices and elected two U.S.
208
Senators, John Carlile and Waitman Willey. The U.S. Senate
209
recognized all of them as the legitimate representatives of Virginia.
Subsequently, a popular election was held on the formation of a new
state, which the citizens approved by a ratio of almost twenty-four to
210
one. They also ratified a new state constitution by an overwhelming
211
margin.
Acting with dispatch, the legislature of this Unionist Virginia
authorized the creation of a new state—“West Virginia”—within its
212
territory, as required by Article IV, Section 3. Congress, whose
204. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. For extended consideration of whether the semicolon in this
clause means that states may never be created from territory within an existing state, see Vasan
Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291,
332–95 (2002). The authors conclude that, although the text is ambiguous, the original
understanding supports the constitutionality of forming new states in this situation. Id. at 395.
205. MEINIG, supra note 199, at 482.
206. Id.; GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 199, at 283.
207. GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 199, at 283.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. The vote was 18,489 to 781. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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consent was also required by the constitutional text, debated the West
Virginia bill during June and July 1861 and imposed a condition
precedent: to obtain admission, the citizens of the new state would
first have to amend the proposed state constitution to provide for the
213
eventual abolition of slavery. In December 1862, President Lincoln
signed the enabling act that imposed this condition. Half a year later,
in June 1863, he issued a proclamation recognizing the admission of
214
West Virginia into the United States. Finally, “having completed
this bit of legal legerdemain the federal government of Virginia
215
shifted its headquarters to Alexandria.”
Whereas Confederate President Jefferson Davis approved the
secession of Virginia from the Union, he condemned as “insurrection,
revolution and secession” the creation of West Virginia out of the
216
territory of Virginia. Lincoln, by contrast, vehemently condemned
217
Virginia’s secession as lawless, but he heartily approved of West
Virginia’s creation. Lincoln began by arguing that the creation of
West Virginia was consistent with the textual requirement of
Virginia’s consent. “A body claiming to be [Virginia’s] Legislature
has given it’s [sic] consent,” he noted, and “[w]e can not well deny
that it is such, unless we do so upon the outside knowledge that the
body was chosen at elections, in which a majority of the qualified
218
voters of Virginia did not participate.” It is universal practice,
Lincoln further observed, “to give no legal consideration whatever to
those who do not choose to vote,” which in this situation he
contended would include by implication those who had decided to
219
engage in open rebellion against the Union.
Lincoln also argued that the acceptance of West Virginia as a
220
state was “expedient at this time.” He acknowledged that “[t]he

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. MEINIG, supra note 199, at 482.
216. JEFFERSON DAVIS, 2 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 306
(1881).
217. GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 199, at 283.
218. Abraham Lincoln, Opinion on the Admission of West Virginia into the Union, in 6
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 26, 26 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
219. Id. at 27. See also Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 204, at 325 (“The legal fiction of
Virginia’s consent to the creation of West Virginia follows logically as a sound conclusion from
the sound premises that secession is unlawful and that the federal government has the power to
recognize a lawful, alternative State government where rebellion has displaced the lawful, loyal,
republican regime of a State with a traitorous government.”).
220. Lincoln, supra note 218, at 27–28.
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division of a State is dreaded as a precedent,” but he claimed that “a
measure made expedient by a war, is no precedent for times of
221
peace.” He concluded by observing that “there is . . . difference
enough between secession against the constitution, and secession in
222
favor of the constitution.” Whereas John Carlile had interpreted the
language of Article IV, Section 3, and adopted a workaround, Lincoln
appears to have been gesturing toward an interpretation of the
Constitution as a whole—to what he referred to as “the spirit of the
223
Constitution and the Union.” On this reading of Lincoln’s words,
distortions of the text in the service of preserving the Constitution
when its existence is threatened are less legally problematic than
distortions of the text that aim to destroy the Constitution. Rather
224
than rest only on formalist grounds, as others have done, Lincoln
confessed that stretching the text may sometimes be required to
enable the constitutional project—including the unstretched text
itself—to survive.
Accordingly, Lincoln can be seen as having made two arguments
regarding the creation of West Virginia, just as he did with respect to
his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus at the outset of the Civil
War. First, he argued that the constitutional text was satisfied when
considered in context. Second and alternatively, he suggested that
sometimes constitutional text that seems relatively clear will be
viewed as less than clear if the exigency is great enough. Once again,
one can see how the clarity or ambiguity of the text is partly
constructed by the very interpretive modalities that it constrains.
F. Recess Appointments
The above examples highlight the potential influence of
perceived purposes, structural inferences, conceptions of the national
ethos, and consequentialist considerations in determining the clarity
of the constitutional text. For a number of reasons, longstanding
225
customary practice can also affect the perception of textual clarity.
The stakes are likely to be higher in this context because of

221. Id. at 28.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 27.
224. See generally Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 204 (offering an originalist analysis of the
meaning of Article IV, Section 3).
225. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 430–32, 455–61 (2012).
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expectation interests that have developed as a result of such
226
practice. The existence of longstanding practice might also be
viewed as carrying with it latent Burkean wisdom or at least a
227
suggestion of workability. In addition, most interpreters feel some
obligation to align interpretations with most practice, especially if the
practice seems unlikely to change—for example, where there is
unlikely to be judicial review, or where courts are unlikely to believe
that they have the institutional capacity or democratic legitimacy to
228
overturn the practice. This felt obligation probably stems from a
number of psychological and jurisprudential considerations.
Interpreters may desire to be relevant and influential, which may
require that their assessments of the law be realistic. Of more
theoretical significance, they may sense that the legitimacy of law
requires some correspondence between the claims that it makes and
229
the reality of its operation.
A recent example of the influence of customary practice on
constitutional interpretation is the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in
230
NLRB v. Noel Canning. In that case, the Court interpreted the
phrase “the Recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause of Article II,
231
Section 2, as allowing the president to make recess appointments
not only during the breaks between annual sessions in the Senate but

226. See id. at 425.
227. See id. at 426; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353,
408 (2006) (defending an approach to constitutional interpretation that emphasizes “the need to
develop law with close reference to established practices and traditions”).
228. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 225, at 429–30, 456.
229. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 66 (“The justification need not fit every aspect or
feature of the practice, but it must fit enough for the interpreter to be able to see himself as
interpreting that practice, not inventing a new one.”); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW
81 (1964) (discussing the importance of “congruence between official action and the law”). This
does not mean that interpreters invariably align their perception of the clarity of the text with
practice. For an important instance in which the Supreme Court concluded that longstanding
governmental practice was inconsistent with clear text, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
In Chadha, the Court held that a “legislative veto” provision was unconstitutional because it
violated the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, id. at 945, which requires that “[e]very Bill
which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a
Law, be presented to the President of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. The
Court so concluded notwithstanding a substantial modern practice of including legislative veto
provisions in regulatory statutes.
230. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). For additional discussion of this
decision, see Bradley & Siegel, supra note 116.
231. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which
shall expire at the End of their next Session.”).
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also during substantial breaks within the annual sessions. The Court
next interpreted the phrase “vacancies that may happen” in the
Clause as allowing the president to make recess appointments even
233
for vacancies that occur before a recess. The Court also held,
however, that in order for a break in Senate business to trigger the
president’s recess appointments authority, the Senate must be out of
session longer than three days and, absent extraordinary
234
circumstances, at least ten days. Furthermore, the Court reasoned
that “the Senate is in session when it says it is, provided that, under its
235
own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate business.”
In reaching these conclusions, the Court relied heavily on
customary practice, as well as on its view of the purpose of the Recess
Appointments Clause. As a background proposition, the Court
announced that, because the issues in the case “concern[ed] the
allocation of power between two elected branches of Government,” it
236
would place “significant weight upon historical practice.”
In
interpreting the phrases “the Recess” and “vacancies that may
happen,” the Court then invoked historical practice, especially
modern practice, in support of a reading of the Clause that permits
237
broad presidential authority to make recess appointments. The
Court also argued that this broad reading was supported by the
Clause’s purpose of ensuring that the Executive Branch would
continue to function effectively when the Senate was unable to
238
consider nominations for Executive Branch positions. Historical
practice and purposive considerations also informed the Court’s
determination of the length of time required for a break in Senate
239
business to constitute a “recess” for purposes of the Clause.
The majority premised its reliance on these nontextual
modalities on the claim that the text of the Recess Appointments
240
Clause was ambiguous. The Court thus appeared to accept the

232. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2567.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2566–67.
235. Id. at 2574.
236. Id. at 2559 (emphasis removed).
237. See id. at 2561–64, 2570–73.
238. See id. at 2561, 2564, 2568.
239. See id. at 2566–67.
240. See id. at 2561 (“The constitutional text is thus ambiguous.”); id. at 2568 (“The question
is whether the Clause is ambiguous.”); id. at 2577 (“We believe that the Clause’s text, standing
alone, is ambiguous.”).
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proposition, emphasized by Justice Scalia in his concurrence in the
judgment, that clear text is controlling, regardless of other
241
considerations. During the oral argument in the case, Justice Scalia
repeatedly asked the solicitor general whether clear constitutional
242
text could ever be trumped by longstanding practice. Although the
solicitor general answered affirmatively, he also emphasized that it
would be “extremely unlikely” for longstanding practice to develop in
243
a way that is contrary to clear text. Unlike the solicitor general, no
Justice in Noel Canning suggested that practice (or any other
244
considerations) could prevail over clear text.
In part of its analysis, however, the Court articulated a thin
understanding of ambiguity, allowing ready invocation of extratextual
considerations. Critically for present purposes, this thin
understanding seems itself to have been prompted in part by
extratextual considerations.
The Court plausibly concluded that the plain meaning of the
phrase “the Recess” was linguistically ambiguous because the phrase
could mean either the single break between yearly sessions of the
Senate or any substantial break in Senate business. Even so, the
Court gave significant weight to considerations of purpose and
historical practice to confirm its claim that the phrase does not refer
only to intersession recesses. As the Court explained:
The upshot is that restricting the Clause to inter-session recesses
would frustrate its purpose. It would make the President’s recessappointment power dependent on a formalistic distinction of Senate
procedure. Moreover, the President has consistently and frequently
interpreted the word “recess” to apply to intra-session recesses, and
has acted on that interpretation. The Senate as a body has done

241. See, e.g., id. at 2617 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“What the majority needs
to sustain its judgment is an ambiguous text and a clear historical practice.”).
242. See Transcript, NLRB v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, at 6–8 (Jan. 13, 2014), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-1281_3d9g.pdf.
243. See id. at 8.
244. In his dissent in Chadha, Justice White emphasized the longstanding practice of
legislative vetoes but did not claim that such practice could override clear text. Instead, he
argued that there was a “silence of the Constitution on the precise question.” INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 977 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). In particular, White reasoned that the
Presentment Clause applies to exercises by Congress of “original lawmaking authority,” and
that “[t]he power to exercise a legislative veto is not the power to write new law without
bicameral approval or Presidential consideration.” Id. at 979–80. This distinction between
disregarding the text and concluding that the text does not address a particular issue also
characterizes the Supreme Court’s approach to the Eleventh Amendment. See supra Part II.D.
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nothing to deny the validity of this practice for at least threequarters of a century. And three-quarters of a century of settled
practice is long enough to entitle a practice to “great weight in a
245
proper interpretation” of the constitutional provision.

It is even easier to see the influence of extratextual
considerations on the Court’s finding of ambiguity for the phrase
“vacancies that may happen.” As the Court acknowledged, “the most
natural meaning” of the word “happen” as applied to the word
246
“vacancy” is that the vacancy must occur during the recess. The
Court insisted, however, that this was “not the only possible way to
247
use the word,” because “happen” may also mean “exist.” The Court
then concluded that the purpose of the Clause and historical practice
supported the broader reading. These extratextual considerations
were relevant, the Court said, because there was “some linguistic
248
ambiguity.” If the Court’s understanding of the practice and the
purpose of the Clause had not been contrary to the most natural
meaning of the phrase, however, it seems unlikely that the Court
would have described the text as ambiguous. But, as the Court stated,
it was unwilling to “render illegitimate thousands of recess
249
appointments reaching all the way back to the founding era.”
Justice Scalia’s concurrence, by contrast, argued that the relevant
text was clear, and that it supported a substantially narrower recess
appointments authority. Just as the majority’s perception of
ambiguity seems to have been influenced by extratextual
considerations, however, so too was Justice Scalia’s perception of
clarity. Throughout his concurrence, and not merely in response to
the majority’s’ contrary arguments, Scalia emphasized what he
understood to be the purpose of the Clause, which was to operate as
250
“a tool carefully designed to fill a narrow and specific need,” while
251
“preserv[ing] the Senate’s role in the appointment process.” In light
of this purpose, Scalia perceived that the Clause clearly prohibited
the use of recess appointments to avoid senatorial opposition to
appointees, even though such use has been characteristic of modern
245.
(1929)).
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2573 (quoting The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 690
Id. at 2567.
Id.
Id. at 2573.
Id. at 2577.
Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2597.
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practice. “The need [that the Clause] was designed to fill no longer
exists,” he wrote, “and its only remaining use is the ignoble one of
enabling the President to circumvent the Senate’s role in the
252
appointment process.”
One can also discern in such statements, as well as certain
statements in the majority opinion, the subtle but pivotal role of
structural and ethos considerations in influencing each coalition’s
perception of textual ambiguity or clarity. At a time when Americans
are divided over whether it should be less or more difficult for the
federal government to function in various ways, Justice Breyer,
writing for the majority, invoked the authority of Alexander
Hamilton for the proposition that “the vigour of government is
253
essential to the security of liberty.” Scalia, in contrast, portrayed the
structural provisions of the Constitution as “reflect[ing] the founding
generation’s deep conviction that ‘checks and balances were the
foundation of a structure of government that would protect
254
liberty.’” In Noel Canning, Breyer’s and Scalia’s perceptions about
the ambiguity or clarity of the Recess Appointments Clause appeared
to reflect in part their hopes and fears about federal power.
III. IMPLICATIONS, OBJECTIONS, AND BENEFITS
As the previous Part illustrated, constructed constraint is the
phenomenon by which constitutional text that is perceived to be clear
both constrains American interpretive practice and is constructed by
that practice. This Part begins by identifying the implications of
constructed constraint for several concepts in modern constitutional
theory: “constitutional construction,” the “unwritten Constitution,”
and the “Constitution outside the Constitution.” This Part then
examines three possible objections to the theory of constructed
constraint: that it is nonfalsifiable, that it reduces to disputes over
methodology, and that it is all construction and no constraint. Next,
this Part offers some generalizations about when the constitutional
text is more or less likely to be subject to construction. Finally, this
Part concludes by identifying certain benefits that the practice of
constructed constraint helps to produce for the constitutional system.

252. Id. at 2598.
253. Id. at 2577 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton)).
254. Id. at 2593 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 722 (1986)).
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A. Implications for Modern Constitutional Theory
Recent work relating to the nontextual aspects of U.S.
constitutionalism can be understood as efforts to better address two
enduring issues in constitutional theory. The first is the tension
between the “dead hand” problem and the countermajoritarian
difficulty. The dead hand problem concerns the present authority of
constitutional provisions approved long ago by people who are in
255
The
many ways unrepresentative of current generations.
countermajoritarian difficulty concerns the legitimacy of having
unelected judges override the choices of today’s majorities based on
256
their interpretations of these provisions. When addressing one of
these issues, interpretive theories often have trouble with the other.
Originalist theories, for example, have a better answer to the
countermajoritarian difficulty than they do to the dead hand problem.
Variants of living constitutionalism, by contrast, have the opposite
257
strengths and weaknesses.
The second issue in constitutional theory that is addressed by
recent work on the extratextual Constitution is the need to account
for the reality of constitutional change absent formal written
amendments. One response to this perceived need has been to
expand the understanding of what qualifies as constitutional law. The
thought is that doing so might reduce pressures to formulate theories
of constitutional change absent Article V amendments. The most
prominent such theory to which scholars are responding is Bruce
Ackerman’s submission that the Constitution can be amended as a
258
result of certain “constitutional moments.”
This Article now considers several distinctions that theorists
have drawn, at least in part, to address these two issues.
255. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 18, at 225 (“Even if the adopters freely consented to the
Constitution, . . . this is not an adequate basis for continuing fidelity to the founding document,
for their consent cannot bind succeeding generations. We did not adopt the Constitution, and
those who did are dead and gone.”).
256. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962) (“The
root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.”). Much
scholarship in law and political science questions Bickel’s claim that the Court is a
countermajoritarian institution, at least in any long-term sense. See generally, e.g., BARRY
FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
257. See Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631, 1656,
1661–70 (2009); see also POST, supra note 165, at 42–43.
258. See generally 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 84, and 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 84; see also
supra text accompanying note 84.
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1. Constitutional Construction. In recent years, a number of
theorists have distinguished between “constitutional interpretation”
259
and “constitutional construction.” It is not clear that all of these
theorists have precisely the same concepts in mind when they make
this distinction. In general, though, they use the terms to distinguish
between constitutional determinations that are closely linked to the
text (which they call “interpretation”) and those that supplement the
text (which they call “construction”). For example, political scientist
Keith Whittington—a leading proponent of the distinction between
interpretation and construction—explains that interpretation “takes
the text as its touchstone,” whereas construction does not “deal[] so
260
explicitly and obsessively with the terms of the document itself.”
Randy Barnett has elaborated on this distinction. As he explains,
construction takes place primarily when the text is unclear:
Where the semantic meaning of the text provides enough
information to resolve a particular issue about constitutionality,
applying it will require little, if any, supplementation, and
construction will look indistinguishable in practice from
interpretation. That each state is entitled to two Senators requires
little construction to apply. But however much information is
contained in the text of the Constitution, there is not always
enough information to resolve a particular issue without something
261
more.

Construction, Barnett writes, is principally for situations in which
262
there is not enough information “contained in the text.” Lawrence
Solum agrees that practitioners are in “the construction zone” when
263
the constitutional text is “vague or irreducibly ambiguous.”
Jack Balkin, in setting out his theory of “framework originalism”
that is described in Part II.B, similarly relies on the distinction
259. This distinction is associated with a strain of scholarship called the “new originalism.”
See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 714 (2011);
Solum, supra note 2, at 467–68.
260. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2; see also Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New
American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 119–20 (2010) (“Interpretive practice is
supplemented through a process of constitutional construction. . . . Construction picks up where
interpretation leaves off.”).
261. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 67
(2011).
262. For a somewhat similar account of the distinction, see Solum, supra note 2, at 457.
263. Solum, supra note 2, at 467–68; see also Whittington, supra note 260, at 120–21
(defining “the realm of construction” as the space in which “the Constitution as written cannot
in good faith be said to provide a determinate answer to a given question”).
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between interpretation and construction. Under Balkin’s account, the
constitutional text establishes the basic framework of governance
upon which participants in constitutional debates can build. Balkin
expressly distinguishes the “ascertainment of the meaning” of the text
from the activity of constitutional construction, which he says involves
“arguments from history, structure, ethos, consequences, and
264
precedent.” Constructions, as Balkin further explains, “exist to fill
265
out and implement the text.”
By contrast, this Article understands the authoritative meaning
of the constitutional text as being determined by a process of
constructed constraint. This understanding of the text unsettles the
distinction between interpretation and construction to the extent that
defenders of this distinction aspire to describe constitutional
practice—and not just to prescribe how practice should unfold. The
considerations that are relevant to construction do not merely
supplement the determination of the meaning of the text, and they do
not come into play only when the text is unclear. Rather, they also
affect the threshold assessment of whether the text is unclear.
Construction, in other words, not only takes place on top of the
textual framework, but also partially determines the framework itself.
Accordingly, it is artificial to separate constitutional interpretation
from the “construction zone.”
One attraction of the idea of “constitutional construction,” as
these theorists use the term, is that it makes originalism descriptively
more accurate of existing practice. In particular, by acknowledging
the phenomenon of constitutional construction, originalists have
accepted the insight—emphasized by critics of originalism—that the
Constitution sometimes enacts broad principles or standards rather
than specific rules, and that in these situations the semantic meaning
266
of the text does not—because it cannot—resolve concrete cases.
267
This concession is too strong for some originalists. The theory of
constructed constraint suggests, however, that originalists have
conceded too little ground, not too much. Participants in interpretive
264. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 4.
265. Id. at 54; see also Whittington, supra note 260, at 121 (“[C]onstitutional constructions
are built within the boundaries, or to use Jack Balkin’s phrase, within the framework, of the
interpreted Constitution.”).
266. Colby, supra note 259, at 731.
267. See generally, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 751 (2009).
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practice characteristically feel bound by constitutional text that they
deem clear, but their perception of its clarity is often not determined
primarily—let alone exclusively—by its original semantic meaning.
2. America’s Unwritten Constitution. The 1970s was a time of
increasing debate between “interpretivist” and “noninterpretivist”
268
approaches to the Constitution. This debate was triggered in part by
269
the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade. Two years later,
Thomas Grey published a provocative article entitled Do We Have an
270
Unwritten Constitution?
Grey contended that, in addition to
enforcing the written Constitution, courts properly had the
“additional role as the expounder of basic national ideals of
individual liberty and fair treatment, even when the content of these
ideals is not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written
271
Constitution.”
Grey’s account was partly descriptive. In arguing that courts
were already playing such a role, Grey recited a number of examples
in which the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions seemed to him
to have at most a limited grounding in the text. “The dominant norms
of decision,” he argued, “are those large conceptions of governmental
structure and individual rights that are at best referred to, and whose
content is scarcely at all specified, in the written Constitution—dual
272
federalism, vested rights, fair procedure, equality before the law.”
Critics of Grey included not only textualists, but also a group of
scholars (including Owen Fiss) whom Grey would subsequently call
268. In 1980, John Hart Ely wrote that
we are likely to call the contending sides “interpretivism” and “noninterpretivism”—
the former indicating that judges deciding constitutional issues should confine
themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written
Constitution, the latter the contrary view that courts should go beyond that set of
references and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the
document.
ELY, supra note 27, at 1.
269. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
270. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1975).
271. Id. at 706.
272. Id. at 708. For additional writings by Grey relating to the unwritten Constitution, see
Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978); Thomas C.
Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Grey, Scripture]; and
Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211 (1988). For
a more recent argument that conservative Justices are invoking forms of unwritten
constitutional law, such as in the area of state sovereign immunity, see Jed Rubenfeld, The New
Unwritten Constitution, 51 DUKE L.J. 291 (2001).
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273

“rejectionists.” These scholars, according to Grey, maintained that
“judges are always interpreting the constitutional text, but [that] this
is not the kind of significant constraint on judicial activism that
textualists think it is—the text, if read with an appropriately generous
notion of context, provides as lively a Constitution as the most activist
274
judge might need.” As a result, these scholars rejected the need for
any division between interpretive and noninterpretive aspects of
constitutional doctrine; for them, it was all interpretive, even when
one included (for example) the Warren Court’s expansive approach
to certain constitutional rights.
Debates over the “unwritten Constitution” are now being
revived in the wake of the publication of Akhil Amar’s important
275
book America’s Unwritten Constitution. Notwithstanding its title,
much of Amar’s book presents sophisticated arguments designed to
show that the constitutional text, properly read, supports various
well-accepted features of constitutional law, including some features
that have been thought to have little connection to the text. In this
sense, the book is more about the written than the unwritten
Constitution, and is akin to the approach of the “rejectionist” critics
of Grey’s defense of the unwritten Constitution. As David Strauss
argues in reviewing Amar’s book, “[T]he theme [of the book] is that
what might appear to be an unwritten constitutional practice—one
with a tenuous connection to the text—actually has a secure basis in
the text itself, as long as you pick and choose the right clause and read
276
the text the right way.” Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of his
common law approach to constitutional law, Strauss is critical of this
theme. In his view, Amar’s strenuous efforts to connect constitutional
doctrine to the text obscure the descriptive and normative importance
of nontextual considerations in the development of constitutional law.
The account of constructed constraint offered in this Article
corroborates the proposition, emphasized by rejectionist critics of
Grey and illustrated by Amar’s approach, that American interpretive
practice does not readily acknowledge a freestanding unwritten
Constitution. Even if their efforts may not be as energetic as Amar’s,
273. See Grey, Scripture, supra note 272, at 2; see also Fiss, supra note 45.
274. Grey, Scripture, supra note 272, at 2.
275. See AMAR, supra note 1.
276. Strauss, supra note 147, at 1560. An exception is Amar’s chapter on the “institutional
constitution,” in which he discusses the importance of governmental practice in informing the
powers of Congress and the president, while also noting that such practice “rarely goes against
the canonical document.” AMAR, supra note 1, at 335.

BRADLEY SIEGEL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

CONSTRUCTED CONSTRAINT

4/1/2015 5:38 PM

1273

interpreters typically try hard to connect their constitutional
277
arguments to the text. At the same time, constructed constraint
confirms the insight of Grey, Strauss, and others that much of
importance in constitutional law cannot be found in the text. It is
instead partially constructed from extratextual considerations. Even
Grey and Strauss, however, distinguish sharply between clear and
unclear text, and their support for an unwritten Constitution is
278
focused on the latter category. Constructed constraint, by contrast,
emphasizes that extratextual considerations can also be important in
determining which portions of text are clear and which are unclear.
Thus, the account of constructed constraint differs somewhat from
both the rejectionist and unwritten Constitution perspectives, even
while it recognizes that both perspectives capture important aspects
of American constitutional practice.
3. The Constitution Outside the Constitution.
Another
distinction, developed most recently by Ernest Young and anticipated
279
by Karl Llewellyn,
is between the Constitution and the
280
“Constitution outside the Constitution.” Young correctly notes that
some of the functions typically ascribed to constitutional law, such as
organizing the government and conferring individual rights, are often
performed in the United States by nonconstitutional materials, such
as federal statutes. In arguing that such “extracanonical norms”
should be considered part of American constitutional law, Young
contends that these norms can be at least as entrenched—that is, as
“difficult to alter”—as other, well-accepted aspects of constitutional
281
law. For example, Young notes plausibly that the statutory right to
retirement benefits under the Social Security Act is less likely to be

277. See supra Part I.B; see also Sachs, supra note 1, at 1801 (“[A]s it happens, our social
conventions don’t acknowledge any ‘unwritten Constitution’—at least not right now, and not in
those terms.”).
278. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 147, at 1535 (“The text obviously answers some important
questions without any recourse to what might be called an unwritten Constitution: the length of
the President’s term in office and how many senators each state has, for example.”); Grey, supra
note 270, at 706 (acknowledging that “the Constitution is a written document, expressing some
clear and positive constraints upon governmental power”).
279. See generally Llewellyn, supra note 59 (distinguishing between “the working
Constitution” and the “Document”).
280. See Young, supra note 3, at 473. For an endorsement of this idea, see TUSHNET, supra
note 3, at 6–8.
281. Young, supra note 3, at 413.
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substantially changed in the coming years than the constitutional right
282
to an abortion or the constitutional right to burn the American flag.
This concept of the “Constitution outside the Constitution” is
valuable because it forces attention to what lies behind the use of the
term “constitutional,” especially if this term is applied to materials
that are not directly connected to the constitutional text. As Young
suggests, moreover, a broader understanding of what counts as
constitutional law might reduce pressures to formulate theories of
how the “big-C” Constitution can change absent a formal
amendment—such as Bruce Ackerman’s theory of “constitutional
283
moments.”
As discussed earlier, Ackerman’s theory, though
controversial, aims to reconcile what appear to be significant changes
over time in U.S. constitutional law with the existence of a written
Constitution that is purportedly unchanging until amended. Adopting
a broader conception of “the Constitution” is an alternative
approach.
Notwithstanding these virtues, there are potential difficulties
with enlarging the boundaries of constitutional law in this manner. To
justify the enlargement, Young emphasizes how nonconstitutional law
can become entrenched, and he notes that “entrenchment may be all
that sets the canonical Constitution apart from the rest of our legal
284
system.” When Young describes laws like the Social Security Act as
“entrenched,” he is referring to “the likelihood of fundamental
285
change.” But the likely durability of a law or norm (such as the
Social Security Act) does not by itself show that it is difficult to alter;
286
it might just show that there is little desire to alter it. It can also be
hazardous to hypothesize that particular nonconstitutional laws or
norms are entrenched. For example, writing in 2007, Young
reasonably suggested that the filibuster in the Senate was
287
entrenched. We now know that Senate Democrats dramatically
288
curtailed it in 2013.

282. Id. at 427.
283. Id. at 455–56.
284. Id. at 426 (emphasis omitted).
285. Id. at 427.
286. See Levinson, supra note 76, at 702. For discussion of various possible meanings of
entrenchment, see Primus, supra note 5, at 1137–38.
287. Young, supra note 3, at 427–28.
288. See Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Vote Curbs Filibuster Power To Stall Nominees, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2013, at A1. Although the filibuster is a longstanding procedure designed to
protect minority interests in the Senate, it is not mandated by the constitutional text. The lack of
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More fundamentally, when Young describes the entrenchment of
nonconstitutional law, he is referring to political entrenchment—that
289
is, the difficulty of overcoming “powerful constituencies.” As he
seems to acknowledge elsewhere, however, political entrenchment
does not fully capture what is typically meant in American
interpretive practice by the entrenchment of constitutional law. To
many observers, a fundamental aspect of constitutional law is that it is
legally entrenched—meaning that it is not viewed as subject to change
290
by the usual majoritarian processes for altering law. Instead, it is
generally acknowledged that changes in constitutional law can occur
both with an Article V amendment of the text and without it—most
notably, through new Supreme Court interpretations. There is also
some recognition that a longstanding accretion of practice might
291
change constitutional law, especially for issues (such as separation
292
of powers questions) that are unlikely to be decided by the courts.
But constitutional law is otherwise thought to be legally entrenched
293
against alteration through the normal political process. This sort of
legal entrenchment does not exist for the materials that Young
identifies as the “Constitution outside the Constitution.” No one
argues, for example, that Congress is legally precluded from altering
or repealing the Social Security Act—and, in fact, Congress has

a textual hook in this instance appeared to make it easier for Democrats to change the practice
in response to charges that Republicans were abusing it. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid
argued, for example, that “[t]he Founding Fathers never had any place in the Constitution about
filibusters or extended debate.” Burgess Everett, Harry Reid: Actively Weighing “Nuclear
Option”, POLITICO (Nov. 19, 2013, 6:57 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/harry-reidfilibuster-nuclear-option-100074.html.
289. Young, supra note 3, at 427.
290. Whereas Young’s conception of constitutional entrenchment is too permissive, others
seem too restrictive. In discussing the entrenchment of constitutional law, Richard Primus refers
to the proposition that “[c]onstitutional rules can be changed only through the process
described in Article V.” Primus, supra note 5, at 1089. This conception of entrenchment is more
restrictive than the prevailing understanding in American interpretive practice. As a
consequence, Primus must conclude that constitutional law does not always have this
characteristic of entrenchment. See id. at 1100. Similarly, Primus lists the availability of judicial
review as an element of constitutional law. Id. at 1089. Because it may not be, however, he must
note as part of his unbundling that constitutional law is not always associated with judicial
review. Id. at 1115, 1117–18.
291. For a discussion, see generally Bradley & Siegel, supra note 116.
292. See generally Bradley & Morrison, supra note 225 (detailing the reliance on historical
practice to help resolve separation of powers questions).
293. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 77, at 89 (declining to include certain norms within the
category of constitutional law “[i]f the relevant officials thought that, even absent special
circumstances, they could amend one of these norms”).
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altered the Act a number of times by raising the age qualifications to
294
receive benefits.
The theory of constructed constraint further complicates the idea
of the “Constitution outside the Constitution.” As previously
295
discussed, the constitutional text has special attributes in American
interpretive practice that distinguish it from other legal materials. In
particular, it is almost never regarded as a legally acceptable move to
argue for legislative (or other) disregard of the text. By contrast, even
if it would be politically unpopular, it is a legally acceptable move to
argue for legislative override of politically entrenched statutes (or
other entrenched norms like the filibuster). No one argues, for
example, that it would be unconstitutional to privatize Social
Security. In other words, the phrase “the Constitution outside the
Constitution” changes the meaning of the term “Constitution” from
the first usage to the second in a way that elides critical differences in
meaning and implications for constitutional practice.
In addition, there are strong pressures in American interpretive
discourse to tie constitutional arguments to the text. As Richard
Primus notes, “It is a normal dynamic of American constitutional
interpretation that people struggle to close the gap between the text
and the set of rules that are recognized as entitled to supremacy,
296
entrenchment, and judicial review.” These pressures do not apply,
however, to the “Constitution outside the Constitution.” To return to
the example of Social Security benefits, they may be entrenched, but
no one argues that these benefits are required by the constitutional
text. Such an argument, moreover, would almost certainly be rejected
by a court.

294. Young makes clear that, even though he is categorizing various nonconstitutional
norms as part of “the Constitution outside the Constitution,” he is not claiming that they have
the same legal status as norms that are conventionally regarded as being part of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Young, supra note 3, at 454 (“When I say that constitutional functions
are often performed by ‘ordinary’ laws, I do not mean to suggest that such laws cease to be
‘ordinary’ by virtue of those functions.”). This concession indicates that Young’s attempt to
provide a broader account of “the Constitution” is made possible only by changing the meaning
of the term.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 66–85.
296. Primus, supra note 5, at 1106; see also Dorf, supra note 77, at 75 (describing how
interpreters in American constitutional practice seek to connect their arguments to the text of
the Constitution); Strauss, supra note 147, at 1534 (“In American constitutional law, every claim
about what the law requires must, in some way, be connected to the text of the written
Constitution.”) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 1).
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The above complications arise as a result of the “constrained”
part of constructed constraint. The “Constitution” inside the
“Constitution” constrains in a way that the “Constitution” outside the
“Constitution” does not. The “constructed” side of constructed
constraint further complicates the project of the “Constitution outside
the Constitution.” Part of the goal of Young’s project, as noted above,
is to broaden the scope of the “small-c” Constitution and thereby
insulate the “big-C” Constitution from the need to accommodate
297
constitutional change absent changes in the text, a need that
theories like Ackerman’s account of “constitutional moments” seek
298
to meet. Because the constitutional text is partially constructed,
however, the big-C Constitution cannot be insulated in the manner
attempted by the “Constitution outside the Constitution.” The
determination of what is covered by the big-C Constitution is itself
partially constructed, and the very considerations that will suggest the
need for change are also likely to affect the construction. Regardless
of its ultimate persuasiveness, Ackerman’s theory takes some account
of the partial construction of the constitutional text, and his theory is
one possible way to impose normative limits on this process.
B. Objections to the Theory of Constructed Constraint
This Section addresses three potential criticisms of the theory of
constructed constraint. The first is that the descriptive account of
practice offered by constructed constraint is nonfalsifiable. The
second is that interpretive methodology will overwhelm the other
factors that this Article has suggested are relevant to constructed
constraint. The third is that American interpretive practice evidences
only construction, not constraint. We consider each criticism in turn.
1. Is the Theory Falsifiable? One potential objection to the
theory of constructed constraint is that it is nonfalsifiable. What
would it take, someone might reasonably ask, to show that American
interpretive practice is not constrained by perceptions of textual
clarity, or that the perceived clarity of the text is not partially
constructed by extratextual considerations? Regardless of whether
falsifiability is a relevant concept when assessing the merits of
particular approaches to interpretation, it does seem relevant when

297. Young, supra note 3, at 456–57.
298. See generally 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 84 (setting forth the theory of “constitutional
moments”).
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assessing claims, such as those made here, that purport to describe
interpretive efforts. For example, it would be uncontroversial to label
as “false” the descriptive claim that constitutional interpreters in the
United States routinely consult astrology in making interpretive
claims. By contrast, it would be controversial to describe as “false”
normative theories of interpretation, such as variants of originalism or
living constitutionalism.
As an initial matter, a theory can be informative even if it is
difficult to verify. Such a theory can, for example, provide a useful
way of understanding certain aspects of human behavior and
institutions. In any event, this Article is not intended to be an
empirical study given the limited number of case studies that it
discusses, and given the limited nature of its central claim. The
Article purports to describe an important part of the practice of
American constitutional interpretation; it does not purport to
describe a phenomenon that always or inevitably occurs. This
Article’s burden, therefore, is simply to show that constructed
constraint does occur in materially important ways. This claim will be
falsified only if it is shown that the phenomenon never occurs or
occurs only in marginal or trivial cases.
Although such falsification would be difficult, it would not be
impossible. Regarding the proposition that the constitutional text is
experienced as a constraint in American interpretive practice, there
are at least two claims that could be addressed by empirical study.
The first has to do with acceptable forms of constitutional argument,
and the second has to do with the realities of constitutional practice.
First, this Article has claimed that it is almost never regarded as
an acceptable move in constitutional discourse to argue for a
disregard of the constitutional text, even though it is an acceptable
move to argue for a disregard of other materials, such as precedent
and customary practice. It is possible to imagine evidence that would
undermine this claim. For example, in debates in 2011 and 2012 over
the extension of the debt ceiling, there were occasional calls for a
disregard of constitutional text suggesting that only Congress could
accomplish the extension, although they do not appear to have been
299
taken seriously. Similarly, during the Supreme Court argument in

299. Many constitutional law commentators have concluded that the president lacks the
unilateral authority to raise the debt ceiling in light of the Constitution’s specific assignment to
Congress of the power “[t]o borrow [m]oney on the credit of the United States.” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 2. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution, Obama and Raising the Debt
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Noel Canning, the solicitor general suggested that longstanding
300
practice might trump clear text, but neither the majority nor the
dissent endorsed the argument.
Second, this Article has claimed that interpreters who favor a
particular outcome sometimes regard the constitutional text as an
obstacle to the achievement of that outcome. In the debate over the
extension of the debt ceiling, for example, there appeared to be a
widespread perception that the text was an obstacle to unilateral
executive action, and the president made public statements to this
effect. Although interpreters sometimes devise workarounds in the
face of text that is deemed constraining (something that can be seen
as another element of the “constructed” part of constructed
constraint), this Article has further claimed that this very effort
reveals the text to be having an effect, and that workarounds are
neither always available nor always as efficacious as direct textual
support. Though potentially difficult to obtain, evidence of internal
political branch or judicial deliberations could undermine this claim if
it showed that interpreters did not take the text seriously or perceived
that effective workarounds were routinely available.
Describing what it would take to falsify the construction
component of constructed constraint is more challenging. This Article
has claimed that American interpretive practice is not strictly
textualist in that, when applying the text and determining whether it
is clear, the practice often takes account of extratextual factors, such
as the perceived purpose of the text, the constitutional structure,
Ceiling, L.A. TIMES (July 29, 2011, 11:41 AM), http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/
2011/07/erwin-chemerinsky-on-why-obama-cant-raise-the-debt-ceiling.html; Laurence H. Tribe,
Op-Ed., A Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A23. To the extent that
others have questioned this conclusion, it has almost always been on the ground that some other
portion of constitutional text might empower the president to raise the debt ceiling, such as the
provision in Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment providing that “[t]he validity of the public
debt of the United States, authorized by law, . . . shall not be questioned.” U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 4. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The 14th Amendment, the Debt Ceiling, and a Way Out, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/us/politics/25legal.html. A few
commentators have suggested that the constitutional text does not matter and that the president
should act simply on the basis of the national interest. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Op-Ed., Obama Should Raise the Debt Ceiling on His Own, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/22/opinion/22posner.html. But this position has not
enjoyed much support. Indeed, notwithstanding even the textual arguments made in support of
presidential power, President Obama ultimately decided that he lacked unilateral authority to
act. See David Jackson, Obama Says He Can’t Raise Debt Ceiling on His Own, USA TODAY
(July 22, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/07/obamaspeaks-at-university-of-maryland/1#.VG9WXYvF98E.
300. See supra notes 242–43.
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claims about the American ethos, consequentialist considerations,
and customary practice. Some textualists would likely concede this
point as an empirical matter, even in arguing that the practice should
be changed. For those who would object on empirical grounds, it may
seem difficult to know what to look for in terms of falsifiability. We
know that there is Bolling, which achieved the morally right result in
part through construction. But where does one look to find the
opposite of Bolling—that is, where does one look for cases in which
interpreters eschew construction even though it would help them to
achieve a preferred result?
The task is made more difficult, to reiterate, by this Article’s
embrace of only partial construction. Given this qualification, some
unspecified number of textual applications that are inconsistent with
extratextual considerations would not falsify the thesis. For example,
it would not falsify the thesis to show that interpreters apply the text
concerning two senators per state notwithstanding their belief that
the consequences are undesirable.
All that said, there may be ways to make an empirical analysis
tractable. It would likely undermine the “constructed” component of
this Article’s thesis if it could be shown that, when making claims
about the text, interpreters routinely ignore the extratextual
considerations described in this Article. Of course, the relevant
interpreters would need to be defined, as would the critical adverb
“routinely” in the above formulation. These are significant obstacles,
but they should not be disabling if in fact there are many instances of
constitutional interpretation that focus only on the semantic meaning
of a constitutional provision.
2. Is Construction Reducible to Methodology? Another potential
objection to the account provided here concerns the role of
constitutional methodology. One might object that methodology, not
the different modalities of constitutional interpretation, is in fact the
central variable. Strict textualists, the argument might run, will not be
open to considering the other extratextual factors described in this
Article, in which case these factors will not affect their perceptions of
textual clarity. By contrast, interpretive methodologies that are open
to extratextual considerations will naturally take account of them.
Methodology, on this view, is the gatekeeper of construction.
The examples in Part II tend to rebut this contention. In those
examples, Justices, presidents, advocates, and academics have not
typically divided over methodology. Textualist-oriented Justices in
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particular have not usually dissented from these acts of construction.
For example, neither most textualists nor nontextualists have argued
for limiting the First Amendment to Congress, and they have
301
accepted Bolling’s reverse incorporation doctrine. Moreover, the
textualist Justices have endorsed a vision of state sovereign immunity
302
that goes well beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment.
In effect, this Article claims that even self-identified textualists in
constitutional interpretation often cannot help themselves: they, like
adherents to other interpretive methodologies, partially construct a
constraining text. To be sure, textualists may occasionally respond
differently than nontextualists to the various extratextual
considerations. Rather than generously interpret the textual provision
in question, for example, they may search harder for alternative text
(such as the Take Care Clause or the Due Process Clause) to support
a particular result (such as the refusal to limit the First Amendment
to Congress). Such efforts, which are common among textualist
303
scholars, often appear to be inspired by the same purposive,
structural, ethos, consequentialist, or practice-based concerns whose
relevance they may purport to deny. What textualists typically will
not do is ignore those considerations altogether. As noted in
Subsection 1, this claim is subject to potential falsification. If it is
correct, however, then methodology will not as a practical matter
control whether the constitutional text is subject to construction.
The embrace by “new textualists” of purposive and
consequentialist considerations is evident in the area of statutory
interpretation. For example, in Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts, Justice Antonin Scalia and legal lexicographer Bryan
Garner reject the “plain meaning” approach to statutory
interpretation that predominated during the early twentieth
304
century. Rather than presume that the meaning of statutes is often
301. See supra Part II.B–C (discussing the applicability of the First Amendment to the entire
federal government and the applicability of equal protection principles to the federal
government).
302. See supra Part II.D. Textualist Justices have also supported the Court’s “anticommandeering” principle, which prohibits Congress from requiring states to enact, administer,
or enforce a federal regulatory program, even though such a principle is not evident in any
constitutional text. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
303. See supra note 143 (noting instances of such efforts).
304. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 53 (2012) (“Any meaning derived from signs involves interpretation, even if the
interpreter finds the task straightforward.”); see, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
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obvious just from the statutory language itself, Scalia and Garner
stress that such language must be understood in context—that
305
“textual meaning” is to be determined “[b]y convention.” “Neither
written words nor the sounds that the written words represent have
306
any inherent meaning,” they observe. “Nothing but conventions and
307
contexts cause a symbol or sound to convey a particular idea.”
For Scalia and Garner, “This critical word context” includes “the
308
purpose of the text, which is a vital part of its context.” They
309
thereby make clear that textualists, too, consider statutory purposes,
even as they reject resort to legislative history by insisting that “the
purpose is to be gathered only from the text itself, consistently with
310
the other aspects of its context.” Scalia and Garner also claim that
the context of statutory language “embraces . . . a word’s historical
associations acquired from recurrent patterns of past usage, and . . . a
word’s immediate syntactic setting—that is, the words that surround it
311
in a specific utterance.” They further include within their idea of
“context” substantive canons such as constitutional avoidance, even
though these canons appear to leave significant room for interpretive
312
discretion and are “based on judicial-policy considerations alone.”
Reviewing the book, Judge Richard Posner criticized Scalia and
Garner’s prescription that judges “look for meaning in the governing
text, ascribe to that text the meaning that it has borne from its
inception, and reject judicial speculation about both the drafters’
extratextually derived purposes and the desirability of the fair
313
reading’s anticipated consequences.” Posner stressed their failure to
follow their own instructions, marveling at “[t]he remarkable
elasticity of Scalia and Garner’s methodology,” and claiming that they
314
display a “lack of a consistent commitment to textual originalism.”
485 (1917) (“Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of
interpretation does not arise.”).
305. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 304, at xxvii.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 33.
309. Id. at 56 (“The difference between textualist interpretation and so-called purposive
interpretation is not that the former never considers purpose. It almost always does.”).
310. Id. at 33 (emphasis omitted).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 31.
313. Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 24, 2012,
at 18, 23–24 (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 304, at xxvii).
314. Id. at 18.
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Margaret Lemos, in her review, similarly observed that “this is not
315
your grandmother’s textualism,” and that over time “the divide
316
between textualism and its competitors has narrowed substantially.”
This narrowing of the divide is another reason why methodology is
unlikely to predominate over the other considerations that are
relevant in discerning textual clarity. Such a narrowing is also
consistent with one of the themes of this Article, which is that the
disagreement between textualism and broader interpretive
317
approaches is less pronounced than is commonly thought.
3. Is There Only Construction, Not Constraint? A third potential
objection is that there is no middle ground between construction and
constraint. The practice relating to the constitutional text that this
Article attempts to capture, it might be argued, actually consists only
of construction, as some critical legal scholars suggested during the
318
1980s. Consistent with this objection, the examples discussed in Part
II can reasonably be described as reflecting more construction than
constraint.
There is an important sense in which this objection is true. The
constitutional text is, to reiterate, just marks on a page; it follows that
textual meaning, ultimately, is entirely constructed one way or
another. This insight, however, takes one only so far. Something can
315. Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
849, 858 (2014) (book review).
316. Id. at 859; see also Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 2027, 2028 (2005) (“Gone largely unnoticed in the battles between [textualists and others]
during the past quarter century is the fact that both sides in the debate agree upon almost
everything when it comes to statutory interpretation.”). But see Jonathan R. Siegel, The
Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 120 (2009) (contending that
“not only do the rival interpretive methods remain distinct, but the fundamental tenets of
textualism cause the gap between interpretive methods to widen, not narrow, with time”).
317. As observed earlier, see supra note 7, the greater the variety of materials that
textualists consider to be part of a defensible textual analysis—including whatever they deem to
be part of the “context” of the text—the closer they will be to doing expressly what this Article
suggests is often done implicitly. Textualists, however, are unlikely to agree that all of the
modalities discussed in this Article are part of a defensible textual analysis. As an account of
American interpretive practice, therefore, there is a divide between almost any version of
textualism and the theory of constructed constraint set forth in this Article. This is true even if
the divide is not as great as is typically characterized. As for which account is descriptively more
accurate, it is worth bearing in mind that descriptive accuracy turns on the actual roles that are
played by the various modalities, not on what particular interpreters assert those roles to be. For
example, the fact that a self-identified textualist Justice declares that “the clear text” trumps
historical practice or consequentialist considerations does not show that what he or she is calling
clear text is independent in fact from those other modalities.
318. See supra Part I.A.
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be constructed and yet still constrain. A brick wall is constructed, but
319
it still hurts to run into it.
The key question is not whether the constraining effect of the
constitutional text is constructed in some fashion—it is. Instead, the
critical question concerns the nature of the constraint. There is a
potentially significant difference in degree between situations in
which the constraints arising from widely shared understandings
about language and textual context permit little additional
construction absent the most fanciful hypothetical circumstances, and
situations in which interpretive meaning largely results from
additional construction. It may be difficult, of course, to draw a line
between the two—that is, between what is considered a “textual”
matter and what is considered extratextual. Different interpreters will
likely draw the line differently. But it is at least possible to talk of
examples falling near one or the other end of the spectrum.
Consider, for example, the Twenty-Second Amendment, which
provides (among other things) that “[n]o person shall be elected to
320
the office of the President more than twice.”
Before this
amendment, there was a strong unwritten norm against presidents
serving a third term, based in part on the precedent established by
321
George Washington. Nevertheless, some presidents (such as Ulysses
S. Grant and Theodore Roosevelt) considered deviating from the
322
norm, and Franklin Roosevelt did run for a third and then a fourth
term. After the Twenty-Second Amendment, however, no one

319. See, e.g., Rapaczynski, supra note 82, at 177 (“The fact that no text by itself constrains
interpretation . . . does not mean that interpretation is unconstrained; only that constraints
operate within a particular context in which the text is interpreted.”); id. at 199
(“[I]nterpretation is a practice that takes place in some social context, and in that context there
are always some more or less definite limits on what can pass as a competent move within that
practice.”).
320. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
321. See JAMES ALBERT WOODBURN, THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT
115 (1903) (“[I]t may now be said to be a part of the unwritten constitution that no President is
eligible to a third term.”). But cf. HERBERT W. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 99 (1925) (“The usage, if usage it may be, is not so firmly established as
absolutely to deter an ambitious man from making the venture.”).
322. See generally MICHAEL J. KORZI, PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 42–78 (2011) (detailing these attempts); Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The
Twice and Future President: Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83
MINN. L. REV. 565, 580–85 (1999) (discussing the views of several presidents on seeking a third
term and the failed efforts by others to do so).
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seriously contemplates having a president seek election for a third
323
term.
Moreover, even though certain features of the Constitution are
heavily criticized, almost no one thinks that, legally, these provisions
can simply be disregarded. Examples include the Electoral College
324
method of electing presidents, the requirement that the president be
325
a “natural born Citizen,” and the provision requiring two senators
326
per state. Presidential candidates who receive an Electoral College
majority are widely accepted as having been legitimately elected,
even when they place second in the popular vote, despite the fact that
such a result may be difficult to defend as a matter of political
327
morality. Likewise, it was widely believed that a constitutional
amendment would be required for Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
328
of California, a naturalized citizen, to become president. And the
requirement of two senators per state—no matter how great the
difference in population between, say, California and Idaho—is
particularly striking given how otherwise deeply entrenched is the
329
judicially fashioned constitutional norm of one person, one vote.
The constitutional text has defeated application of this principle to
the Senate.

323. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 32, at 414 (“The parties concerned know, without
litigating and without consulting lawyers, that Ronald Reagan cannot run for a third
term . . . .”). But see Tushnet, supra note 31, at 687 (hypothesizing a situation in which this
prohibition might be disregarded). Hypothesizing an unlikely scenario in which the text would
be disregarded does not show that the text is unconstraining. Rather, it shows only that the text
is not infinitely constraining. Cf. Schauer, supra note 32, at 422 (“The non sequitur . . . is the
move from the proposition that language is not perfectly precise to the proposition that
language is useless.”).
324. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
325. Id.
326. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
327. Although the Electoral College has some defenders, it has been widely criticized and is
unpopular with the public, and there have been numerous proposals either to eliminate it via
amendment or to adopt a workaround. See, e.g., Alexander Keyssar, Do Away with the Electoral
College, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2012, 10:01 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2012/07/08/another-stab-at-the-us-constitution/revisiting-the-constitution-do-away-with-theelectoral-college.
328. See, e.g., Kirk Semple, Schwarzenegger Backs Amendment To Allow Immigrant
Presidents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2004, at A14.
329. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
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C. When Construction Is More or Less Likely
Part II illustrated, through a series of examples, the partial
construction of the constitutional text in American constitutional
practice. It did not attempt to theorize when construction is more or
less likely to occur. There is cause for caution in attempting to offer
any such account, because the phenomenon may be sufficiently
contingent to defy ex ante specification. Even so, some
generalizations, even if admittedly speculative, may be useful.
First, there is substantial variation in the linguistic precision of
the constitutional text, and such precision is likely to influence the
extent to which the modalities of interpretation will affect perceptions
330
of clarity and ambiguity. Whether a search is “unreasonable,” for
331
instance, or whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual,” is
substantially less linguistically precise than the requirement that “[n]o
Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
332
Appropriations made by Law.” As Jack Balkin has explained, the
Constitution consists of a mix of rules, standards, principles, and
333
silences with different levels of specificity and precision.
Second, perceptions about consequences—including arguments
resting on ideological, moral, or policy values—seem to play a
particularly significant role in motivating and executing construction,
but the practice is not simply reducible to consequentialism. On the
one hand, interpreters are unlikely to construct away from what
Richard Fallon has called the “first-blush” interpretation of the text
unless they have concerns about the consequences associated with
334
this interpretation.
In addition, “arguments of value infuse
335
arguments and influence conclusions within other categories,” such
as whether to read a precedent narrowly or broadly or what
inferences to draw from the institutional relationships established by
the Constitution. On the other hand, it is also likely that perceptions
about consequences are themselves affected by other modalities, such
as purpose, structure, and ethos.
330. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
331. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
332. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
333. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 39.
334. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of
Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within Both, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 685, 689 (2014). Fallon’s subject is statutory interpretation, but the idea of the
“first-blush” meaning of a legal text is also useful in the context of constitutional interpretation.
335. Fallon, supra note 110, at 1238.
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Third, the first-blush interpretation is more likely to hold if the
constitutional provision relates to certain processes of government
rather than to substantive outcomes such as rights. For example,
governmental process provisions that concern the qualifications and
method of election for federal offices tend to be “stickier” in general
because they are needed for coordination so that actors can achieve
their first-order objectives. Such provisions, in other words, enable
democratic politics; they do not simply limit democratic politics.
Moreover, other political actors typically have ample incentive to
336
enforce them.
Fourth, construction seems particularly unlikely for numeric
constitutional provisions. Numbers permit—or, at least, are perceived
to permit—less linguistic argumentation than prose, and so tend to be
stickier in American interpretive practice. For example, even though
the age requirements and the specified term lengths for the
presidency and Congress will negatively affect particular candidates
and office holders, there are no serious efforts to read the
requirements purposively or to otherwise challenge assumptions
about how the requirements should be computed. This is not to say
that numerical provisions are always clear. Nor do we mean to
suggest that there is no scenario under which the meaning of an
otherwise clear numerical provision could become unclear. The point,
rather, is that it would take very unusual circumstances in order for
this to happen.
Fifth, construction is especially unlikely to occur when historical
practice lines up in the same direction as typical plain meaning
considerations. At least in that situation, historical practice seems to
337
have an entrenchment effect.
336. Even though the Court is unlikely to disregard constitutional text that it perceives to be
clear, this does not mean that it will necessarily exercise judicial review to address what it deems
a deviation from clear text. See supra note 75. Especially for certain issues relating to the
processes of government, the Court may conclude that the deviation presents a nonjusticiable
political question. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 288–89 (1993) (applying the
political question doctrine). But cf. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012)
(describing the political question doctrine as a “narrow exception to th[e] rule” that “the
Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly before it”).
337. Thus, for example, whatever its normative appeal, interpreters are unlikely to adopt
Matthew Stephenson’s suggestion that the Constitution be read to treat Senate inaction on
appointments of principal officers as sufficient consent for purposes of the Appointments
Clause, given that such an approach would have to overcome widespread perceptions of the
meaning of the text that align with longstanding historical practice. See Matthew C. Stephenson,
Essay, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without a Senate Confirmation
Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940 (2013). As noted earlier, the opposite is not necessarily true. That is,
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D. Benefits of the Practice
So far, this Article has attempted to describe an important
feature of the role of the constitutional text in American interpretive
practice; it has not sought to assess the normative implications of that
feature. The Article has emphasized description over prescription in
the belief that an accurate understanding of a social practice is both
valuable in itself and an essential prerequisite to sound evaluation of
the practice. With the Article’s descriptive account of constructed
constraint in hand, this Section now sketches a normative defense of
the practice.
The practice of constructed constraint can be evaluated from two
different points of view—from the external perspective of the analyst
of the constitutional system, and from the internal perspective of the
judge or practitioner. The internal perspective can be further divided
338
into the individual and the systemic points of view. The individual
perspective can be held by the faithful participant in constitutional
practice—the citizen, politician, or judge who both makes claims on
the Constitution and who seeks to comply in good faith with the
Constitution. The systemic perspective evaluates a social practice
from the standpoint of the constitutional system as a whole, not from
the perspective of particular participants and their choice of conduct
within the system. The systemic perspective asks, for example,
whether a practice produces system goods. Such goods enhance the
functioning of the constitutional system by improving its ability to
accomplish its purposes, including by negotiating conflicts among
339
different purposes.
Constructed constraint is primarily a descriptive account of part
of U.S. constitutional practice from the external perspective, not a
normative theory of how interpreters should decide particular
constitutional questions from the internal, individual perspective. For
example, constructed constraint neither validates nor condemns any
of the interpretive positions taken by participants in the historical or
historical practice that is perceived to be at odds with traditional plain meaning considerations
does not inevitably result in construction. See supra note 230.
338. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 328 (“In evaluating a constitutional and political system,
we can focus our normative judgments on what individuals in a system should do within the
system or on how the system operates as a whole.”); see also Siegel, supra note 92 (evaluating
the individual and systemic perspectives from which Balkin reasons).
339. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 328 (“Sometimes we should focus on improving individual
behavior, but sometimes the system is the proper focus.”); id. at 328–29 (describing the
individual and systemic perspectives).
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contemporary debates used as examples in this Article—whether over
the meaning of “Congress” in the First Amendment, the creation of
West Virginia, or President Obama’s recess appointments. The theory
itself cannot determine the proper balance between construction and
constraint regarding any particular constitutional question. Nor can it
determine what materials should inform construction in any given
case. To take one of the modalities discussed in Part II, the effect of a
consideration of consequences on constitutional construction will
depend on the interpreter’s view of what consequences are relevant,
the likelihood of their occurrence, and whether they are good or bad.
340
The theory of constructed constraint cannot resolve such questions.
Constructed constraint does, however, act as a counterpoint to
certain theories of constitutional interpretation to the extent that they
purport to account for actual practice. In particular, this Article
contends that constructed constraint is a descriptively better account
of an important part of constitutional practice than approaches that,
as a general matter, conceive of the text either as highly constraining
or as not constraining at all. For example, strict versions of
constitutional originalism and textualism seem unable to explain the
construction and reconstruction of the constitutional text in which
interpreters have engaged over the course of American history. At
the same time, the constraint element of constructed constraint also
rules out approaches that dismiss the possibility, let alone the
constraining effect, of constitutional text that is perceived to be clear.
The possibility of textually perceived constraint may help to explain
why eminent constitutional scholars today, such as Strauss and
Balkin, agree that clear text binds and differ only in the explanation
that they offer for this phenomenon. This possibility may also help to
explain why certain prominent constitutional scholars, such as Balkin,
Tushnet, and Levinson, do not write today about constitutional
questions in the way that they did in the 1980s. In particular, they now
seem more interested in text, history, and doctrine than they were in

340. This Article primarily offers an external, descriptive account of an important part of
constitutional practice; it does not suggest that participants in the practice should reason
publicly in terms of constructed constraint. A distinct question is whether participants should be
more aware of the phenomenon of constructed constraint. One virtue of a greater awareness is
that participants would thereby gain a better appreciation of what they are—and are not—
disagreeing about.
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the earlier period. One might say that the Big-C crits have become
341
little-c crits.
If the normative implications of constructed constraint are
limited from the individual perspective, these implications are more
significant from the perspective of the constitutional system as a
whole. From the systemic perspective, a key question is how the
system functions over time to manage the constitutive tensions
between the different values that are typically associated with
constitutionalism. On the one hand, constitutionalism is widely
thought to entail fundamental legal limits on politics, which help to
make possible the rule of law by restraining the exercise of
342
governmental power. On the other hand, it is also widely recognized
343
that the rule of law itself has political foundations. It follows that
constitutionalism also requires some measure of democratic
responsiveness—some popular participation in the fashioning of
344
constitutional limits. Mindful of this dimension of constitutionalism,
presidents have often stressed the need for the Constitution to keep
345
up with the times.
341. Consider, for example, the contrast between Balkin’s Living Originalism and his critical
and postmodern legal scholarship during the 1980s and early 1990s. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin,
Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987); Jack M. Balkin, The
Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986); Jack M. Balkin, The
Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831 (1991); Jack M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern
Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966 (1992); see also Sanford Levinson, Jack Balkin as the
Picasso of Constitutional Theorists, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 711, 712–13 (analogizing the shift in
Balkin’s approach to shifts in the style of Pablo Picasso).
342. See Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections After the Collapse of
Communism, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY, 633, 642 (1990) (describing the rule of law as “a crucial
and historically rare mode of restraint on power by law”); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its
Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210, 213 (1979) (arguing that the idea of the rule of law
requires the government and the governed to “be ruled by the law and obey it”).
343. See, e.g., Carla Hesse & Robert Post, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL
TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 13, 20 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999) (“[T]he
relationship between the governed and the governors necessary to sustain the rule of law
. . . consists of specific practices that reflect trust and tacit social understandings.”); Neil S.
Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 966–67 (2008) (arguing that
the ability of the governed to recognize the law as their own helps to maintain the relationship
of trust that sustains the rule of law).
344. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 2, at 72 (“Nevertheless, mere conformity to professional
discourse and professional practices is not sufficient for the Constitution to be democratically
legitimate. It is not enough for the Constitution-in-practice to be law. It must also be our law. It
must ultimately be responsive to the public’s values.”).
345. See, e.g., WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 69 (1908) (“[T]he Constitution of the United States is not a mere lawyers’ document: it
is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age.”); see also FRANKLIN DELANO
ROOSEVELT, The Constitution of the United States Was a Layman’s Document, Not a Lawyer’s
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There is relatively little tension between these two elements of
constitutionalism—restraint
and
responsiveness—when
the
constraints imposed by the Constitution facilitate democratic
decisionmaking, such as by structuring and facilitating democratic
346
politics, as discussed in the previous section. There is also relatively
little tension between them when practices of popular sovereignty
reinforce constitutional limits, such as by promoting a democratic
347
political culture of respect for the Constitution. In particular cases,
however, constitutionalism and democracy can be in tension. Such
tensions and conflicts lie at the heart of many debates in
constitutional law, from gun rights to same-sex marriage, and from
abortion to health care reform. A basic question in such cases is the
extent to which the Constitution should be understood as restraining
or responding to popular commitments.
Robert Post and Reva Siegel have coined the phrase “democratic
constitutionalism” to describe the paradoxical relationship between
these two aspects of constitutionalism—“to express the paradox that
constitutional authority depends on both its democratic
348
responsiveness and its legitimacy as law.” “Americans,” they write,
“want their Constitution to have the authority of law, and they
349
understand law to be distinct from politics.” Moreover, “[t]hey
understand that the rule of law is rooted in professional practices that

Contract (Sept. 17, 1937), in 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 359, 363 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941) (“[F]or one hundred and fifty years we
have had an unending struggle between those who would preserve this original broad concept of
the Constitution as a layman’s instrument of government and those who would shrivel the
Constitution into a lawyer’s contract.”).
346. See also, e.g., ELY, supra note 27 (articulating a democracy-promoting theory of judicial
review).
347. Cf. ROBERT C. POST, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of
Social Form, in CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 142, at 189, 192 (stressing that even the
constitutional value of individual self-determination “depends on the maintenance of
appropriate forms of community life”—specifically, “community institutions designed to
inculcate this value”). Mandatory public education in the United States is a prime example of
such a community institution. Id.; see also Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men’s
Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 108, 112 (Roy
P. Basler ed., 1953) (desiring that obedience to the Constitution and laws “become the political
religion of the nation,” and that “the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the grave and the
gay, of all sexes and tongues, and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its altars”).
348. Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 27. For Post and Siegel’s initial, more elaborate
development of the theory of democratic constitutionalism, see generally Robert Post & Reva
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373
(2007).
349. Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 27.
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are distinct from popular politics.” Even so, Post and Siegel stress, if
the public comes to view the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution as wholly unresponsive to popular commitments, then
“the American people will come in time to regard it as illegitimate
and oppressive, and they will act to repudiate it as they did during the
351
New Deal.”
How, then, can the Constitution “function as our fundamental
law, as the limit and foundation of politics, and yet remain
352
democratically responsive”? Political commitments may become
constitutional law in various ways. First, Article V amendments are
rare but have not been impossible over the course of American
history. Second, electoral politics results in acts of constitutional
interpretation and institution building by the political branches, as
353
well as the appointment of Justices and judges. Third, the public
may engage in efforts to change social norms, whether through social
movement advocacy, litigation, or both. Fourth, norm contestation
may also occur through the rhetoric of presidents and other
354
influential politicians. “To succeed in changing social norms,”
Balkin observes, “may be as powerful as changing judges and
politicians, for it alters the underlying sense of what is reasonable and
unreasonable for governments to do. It shifts political and
professional discourse about what is off-the-wall and on-the-wall in
355
making claims on the Constitution.”
Constructed constraint illuminates both the limits and the
potential of non–Article V pathways of constitutional change. The
fact that interpreters feel bound by clear constitutional text enables
the Constitution to partially insulate itself from these pathways. But
the ability of interpreters to work with the text renders the

350. Id. at 27–28.
351. Id. at 28; see also id. at 25–26 (observing that “important aspects of American
constitutional law evolve in response to substantive constitutional visions that the American
people have mobilized to realize,” and that “these responsive features of the law help sustain
the Constitution’s authority in history”).
352. Id. at 28; see also BALKIN, supra note 2, at 71 (“The democratic legitimacy of the
Constitution depends on the people’s belief that their Constitution and their government
belongs to them, so that if they speak and protest and make their views known over time, the
constitutional constructions of courts and the political branches will eventually respond to their
political values and to the issues they care about most.”).
353. See generally Balkin & Levinson, supra note 68 (articulating their theory of partisan
entrenchment through judicial appointments).
354. See BALKIN, supra note 2, at 70–71; Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 28.
355. BALKIN, supra note 2, at 71.
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Constitution more democratically responsive, animating the text with
the values and needs of the people whom the text purports to
356
govern. In other words, constraint empowers the Constitution to
discipline politics, and the construction of constraint vivifies
constitutionalism by infusing it with popular commitments.
In negotiating tensions within constitutionalism between
restraint and responsiveness, constructed constraint attends to the
two enduring issues in constitutional theory that were noted in Part
III.A: the dead hand problem and the countermajoritarian difficulty.
The constraint element of constructed constraint helps to ameliorate
the countermajoritarian difficulty by framing and channeling judicial
discretion in constitutional adjudication. The construction part of
constructed constraint enables interpreters to reduce the dead hand
problem in practice by facilitating constitutional change, not only
through judicial decisionmaking, but also outside the courts—and not
only through written or unwritten constitutional amendments, but
also through working with the text that they already have.
CONCLUSION
Recent scholarship has explored whether and why participants in
American interpretive practice feel bound by constitutional text that
they perceive to be clear. Other work has asked how the text can be
built upon by other materials. This Article, by contrast, has suggested
that it is important to take account of the extent to which the
perceived clarity of the constitutional text is itself constructed. The
clarity of constitutional text is partially constructed, this Article has
explained, because over time, interpreters work on or around the very
text to which they feel bound.
The model of constructed constraint offered here navigates
between strict textualist accounts of the constitutional text and critical
accounts that regard the text as unconstraining. By deemphasizing the
distinction between clear text and extratextual considerations, the
idea of constructed constraint also unsettles the relationship between
interpretation and construction, between the written and unwritten
constitutions, and between the Constitution and the “Constitution

356. Cf. Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral
Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
1473, 1474 (2007) (arguing that the distinction between constitutional law and politics creates
the possibility of the rule of law, but that the uncertain and shifting boundaries of the distinction
help to legitimate the law by infusing it with popular commitments).
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outside the Constitution.” As a normative matter, the practice of
constructed constraint is an important way in which interpreters work
out the potential tensions within democratic constitutionalism
between fidelity to the rule of law and responsiveness to popular
ideals.

